

Supplementary Information

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Introduction

This appendix reports in detail our data collection method and coding procedures and provides additional empirical analyses. Section 1 provides additional information on the two survey waves used for estimating the results reported in the main text, including issues related to recruitment, response rates, balance, and representativeness. Section 2 presents the results reported in the main text in tabular form, and provides additional estimations of the conjoint experiment, including subgroup analyses and interaction effects of different policy attributes. Section 3 describes in detail the results from the first wave of the survey, as well as the design of the first wave policy vignettes. Finally, Section 4 lists the survey questions used in the analysis reported in the main text, as well as the coding of key variables.

1 Survey of the Israeli Public

This section provides additional information on the two survey waves reported in the main text. The surveys were designed to examine public opinion towards various policies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and explicitly evaluate the relative importance that the public assigns to symbolic and material dimensions of conflict-related policies.

1.1 Two Survey Waves

Our study draws on two survey waves administered on Israeli Jewish voters in two distinct time periods. The first wave was fielded in April 2014, during a relatively peaceful period of negotiations led by United States Secretary of State John Kerry. As we describe in our pre-analysis plan on the Experiments in Governance and Politics (EGAPs) Design Registration webpage, the original goal of the first survey was to assess the reaction of Israelis to various policy primes by randomly assigning respondents to descriptions of conciliatory and coercive policies in the conflict. The analysis of the first wave pointed to a puzzling result: that Israelis prefer coercive policies over conciliatory ones, even as they acknowledge that conciliatory measures are more effective. To examine possible explanations for this counterintuitive finding, we designed the second survey wave.

The second survey was conducted in January 2015, a few months after the 2014 conflict in Gaza. The second wave was designed to, first, replicate the first wave’s puzzling results and rule out the possibility that voter irrationality or a ‘fluke’ sample explain the findings. Second, we sought to evaluate whether symbolic attachment to territory explains public support for policies by designing a conjoint experiment that disentangles the symbolic dimensions of territory from its strategic and material ones.

The conjoint experiment asked respondents to choose between two policies under consideration by the Israeli government. For each policy, we randomly varied four attributes across pairings:

the policy’s effects on security, on the economy, on budget allocation to key social services, and on control over territory. One of the key assumptions underlying our experiment is that policy attributes are orthogonal to each other, as well as to respondents’ characteristics. This random assignment enables identifying the causal effect of each attribute on the probability of policy support, and allows us to disentangle policy attributes that are naturally correlated, such as security and territorial control.

Tables 1 through 4 report balance tests for each domain in the conjoint experiment. Since randomization in the conjoint includes a very large number of permutations, we report, for each set of attributes in a given domain, the means and standard deviations of the attributes in other domains, as well as of key demographic characteristics. Table 1 reports balance tests for the territory attributes. The top panel reports means and standard deviations of attributes in other domains, which range from 1 to 3, as described in Table ?? in the main text. The bottom panel reports balance tests for demographic variables. It can be seen that across all conjoint domains and demographic characteristics, the experiment successfully achieved randomization. Tables 2, 3 and 4 report balance tests for the security, economy, and budget domains, respectively. It can be seen that also in these domains our experiment was successfully randomized.

Table 1: Balance Table: Conjoint Territory Attributes

	Mean (Territory: no change)	Std. Dev. (Territory: no change)	Mean (Territory: no change)	Std. Dev. (Territory: no change)	Diff.	Pval
<i>Other conjoint domains</i>						
Security	2.00	0.83	2.00	0.82	0.00	0.92
Economy	1.98	0.82	1.97	0.82	0.02	0.62
Budgets	1.98	0.81	2.00	0.81	-0.02	0.47
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>						
Age	41.01	14.29	41.01	14.29	0.00	1.00
Female	0.54	0.50	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00
Income						
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.26	0.44	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.19	0.39	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.20	0.40	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.18	0.38	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.10	0.29	0.10	0.29	0.00	1.00
Education						
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.26	0.44	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
<i>High school</i>	0.22	0.42	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00
<i>Vocational</i>	0.22	0.42	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00
<i>Academic</i>	0.30	0.46	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Area of residence						
<i>WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.14	0.34	0.14	0.34	0.00	1.00
<i>Outside WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.86	0.34	0.86	0.34	0.00	1.00
Religiosity						
<i>Secular</i>	0.55	0.50	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>Traditional</i>	0.21	0.41	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
<i>Religious</i>	0.13	0.34	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00
<i>Haredi</i>	0.10	0.30	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
Ethnicity						
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.34	0.47	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.44	0.50	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00

Table 2: Balance Table: Conjoint Security Attributes

	Mean (Security: no change)	Std. Dev. (Security: no change)	Mean (Security: less terrorism)	Std. Dev. (Security: less terrorism)	Diff.	Pval	Mean (Security: more terrorism)	Std. Dev. (Security: more terrorism)	Diff.	Pval
<i>Other conjoint domains</i>										
Territory	1.49	0.50	1.52	0.50	-0.02	0.39	1.49	0.50	0.00	0.92
Economy	1.98	0.81	1.97	0.83	0.01	0.74	1.98	0.83	-0.00	1.00
Budgets	2.00	0.81	2.01	0.83	-0.01	0.78	1.96	0.79	0.04	0.34
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>										
Age	41.50	14.03	40.94	14.37	0.56	0.43	40.58	14.46	0.92	0.19
Female	0.54	0.50	0.55	0.50	-0.01	0.68	0.53	0.50	0.01	0.72
Income										
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.24	0.43	0.26	0.44	-0.02	0.36	0.28	0.45	-0.04	0.07
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.19	0.39	0.19	0.39	-0.00	1.00	0.18	0.38	0.01	0.56
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.22	0.41	0.19	0.39	0.03	0.16	0.19	0.39	0.03	0.11
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.17	0.38	0.19	0.39	-0.01	0.57	0.18	0.38	-0.00	0.95
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.10	0.30	0.09	0.29	0.01	0.67	0.10	0.30	0.00	0.96
Education										
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.26	0.44	0.26	0.44	-0.00	0.98	0.25	0.43	0.02	0.44
<i>High school</i>	0.24	0.42	0.22	0.41	0.02	0.41	0.21	0.41	0.03	0.21
<i>Vocational</i>	0.21	0.41	0.22	0.42	-0.01	0.55	0.24	0.42	-0.03	0.18
<i>Academic</i>	0.29	0.46	0.30	0.46	-0.00	0.85	0.31	0.46	-0.01	0.51
Area of residence										
<i>WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.13	0.33	0.14	0.35	-0.02	0.30	0.14	0.35	-0.01	0.46
<i>Outside WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.87	0.33	0.86	0.35	0.02	0.30	0.86	0.35	0.01	0.46
Religiosity										
<i>Secular</i>	0.57	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.03	0.29	0.54	0.50	0.04	0.13
<i>Traditional</i>	0.20	0.40	0.22	0.42	-0.02	0.40	0.22	0.41	-0.01	0.56
<i>Religious</i>	0.13	0.33	0.13	0.33	0.00	0.95	0.13	0.34	-0.01	0.70
<i>Haradi</i>	0.09	0.29	0.10	0.31	-0.01	0.50	0.11	0.32	-0.02	0.21
Ethnicity										
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.34	0.47	0.35	0.48	-0.01	0.71	0.33	0.47	0.01	0.64
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.46	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.03	0.25	0.45	0.50	0.01	0.78

Table 3: Balance Table: Conjoint Economy Attributes

	Mean (Economy: no change)	Std. Dev. (Economy: no change)	Mean (Economy: harmed)	Std. Dev. (Economy: harmed)	Diff.	Pval	Mean (Economy: grow)	Std. Dev. (Economy: grow)	Diff.	Pval
<i>Other conjoint domains</i>										
Territory	1.50	0.50	1.50	0.50	0.00	0.93	1.49	0.50	0.01	0.62
Security	2.02	0.82	1.97	0.83	0.05	0.21	2.02	0.82	-0.00	0.97
Budgets	1.94	0.81	2.01	0.80	-0.07	0.07	2.01	0.82	-0.07	0.10
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>										
Age	41.61	14.37	40.62	13.95	0.99	0.16	40.74	14.52	0.87	0.22
Female	0.53	0.50	0.56	0.50	-0.02	0.32	0.52	0.50	0.01	0.61
Income										
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.27	0.44	0.26	0.44	0.01	0.78	0.25	0.43	0.02	0.46
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.18	0.38	0.18	0.38	-0.00	0.89	0.20	0.40	-0.03	0.19
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.21	0.41	0.17	0.38	0.04	0.07	0.21	0.41	-0.00	0.90
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.17	0.38	0.19	0.39	-0.01	0.55	0.17	0.38	0.00	0.95
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.09	0.28	0.10	0.31	-0.02	0.20	0.10	0.30	-0.01	0.38
Education										
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.26	0.44	0.25	0.43	0.01	0.64	0.27	0.44	-0.01	0.73
<i>High school</i>	0.23	0.42	0.22	0.42	0.01	0.74	0.21	0.41	0.02	0.36
<i>Vocational</i>	0.22	0.41	0.23	0.42	-0.01	0.67	0.22	0.42	-0.01	0.69
<i>Academic</i>	0.30	0.46	0.30	0.46	-0.01	0.72	0.30	0.46	-0.00	0.90
Area of residence										
<i>WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.13	0.33	0.14	0.35	-0.01	0.38	0.14	0.35	-0.01	0.44
<i>Outside WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.87	0.33	0.86	0.35	0.01	0.38	0.86	0.35	0.01	0.44
Religiosity										
<i>Secular</i>	0.56	0.50	0.56	0.50	0.00	0.98	0.55	0.50	0.01	0.69
<i>Traditional</i>	0.22	0.41	0.22	0.41	0.00	0.86	0.21	0.41	0.01	0.52
<i>Religious</i>	0.13	0.34	0.12	0.33	0.01	0.51	0.13	0.34	0.00	0.81
<i>Haredi</i>	0.09	0.29	0.10	0.31	-0.02	0.30	0.12	0.32	-0.03	0.07
Ethnicity										
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.36	0.48	0.32	0.47	0.04	0.10	0.34	0.47	0.02	0.41
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.43	0.50	0.45	0.50	-0.02	0.42	0.45	0.50	-0.02	0.41

Table 4: Balance Table: Conjoint Budget Attributes

	Mean (Budget: no change)	Std. Dev. (Budget: no change)	Mean (Budget: social services decrease)	Std. Dev. (Budget: social services decrease)	Diff.	Pval	Mean (Budget: social services increase)	Std. Dev. (Budget: social services increase)	Diff.	Pval
<i>Other conjoint domains</i>										
Territory	1.49	0.50	1.50	0.50	-0.00	0.86	1.51	0.50	-0.02	0.47
Security	2.01	0.82	2.02	0.84	-0.01	0.78	1.97	0.81	0.04	0.34
Economy	1.94	0.83	1.97	0.81	-0.03	0.51	2.01	0.82	-0.07	0.09
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>										
Age	41.11	14.33	41.06	14.23	0.05	0.94	40.85	14.31	0.26	0.72
Female	0.53	0.50	0.54	0.50	-0.01	0.71	0.54	0.50	-0.01	0.59
Income										
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.27	0.44	0.25	0.43	0.02	0.42	0.26	0.44	0.00	0.87
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.19	0.39	0.19	0.39	0.00	0.98	0.18	0.38	0.01	0.64
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.18	0.39	0.20	0.40	-0.02	0.37	0.21	0.41	-0.03	0.16
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.17	0.37	0.19	0.39	-0.03	0.16	0.18	0.38	-0.01	0.63
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.11	0.31	0.09	0.29	0.01	0.37	0.09	0.28	0.02	0.20
Education										
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.25	0.43	0.27	0.44	-0.02	0.41	0.26	0.44	-0.01	0.65
<i>High school</i>	0.23	0.42	0.21	0.41	0.02	0.36	0.22	0.42	0.01	0.68
<i>Vocational</i>	0.22	0.41	0.22	0.41	0.00	0.98	0.23	0.42	-0.01	0.68
<i>Academic</i>	0.30	0.46	0.30	0.46	-0.00	0.95	0.29	0.45	0.01	0.67
Area of residence										
<i>WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.15	0.35	0.12	0.33	0.02	0.17	0.14	0.34	0.01	0.59
<i>Outside WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.85	0.35	0.88	0.33	-0.02	0.17	0.86	0.34	-0.01	0.59
Religiosity										
<i>Secular</i>	0.54	0.50	0.56	0.50	-0.02	0.37	0.56	0.50	-0.02	0.42
<i>Traditional</i>	0.22	0.41	0.22	0.42	-0.01	0.78	0.20	0.40	0.01	0.52
<i>Religious</i>	0.14	0.35	0.12	0.32	0.03	0.10	0.13	0.34	0.01	0.52
<i>Haredi</i>	0.10	0.30	0.10	0.30	-0.00	1.00	0.11	0.31	-0.00	0.79
Ethnicity										
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.34	0.47	0.34	0.48	-0.00	0.96	0.33	0.47	0.01	0.65
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.44	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.01	0.60	0.46	0.50	-0.01	0.58

1.2 Recruitment into the Study

The surveys were administered by iPanel, Israel’s largest opt-in Internet survey firm, and the only Israeli Internet survey firm to have received a certificate of approval from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem’s Department of Statistics, stating that with appropriate weighting its panel can be used as a sampling frame for the Israeli Jewish population.

We calculate participation rates following the recommendation of ?, who define rates of participation as “the number of respondents who have provided a usable response divided by the total number of initial personal invitations requesting participation” (p. 50). In the first wave, the survey company invited 13,226 individuals to participate, stratified by gender, age, religiosity, and area of residence. Among those, 2,697 began the survey (20.4 percent), and among those who responded, 1,963 completed the first wave (72.8 percent). In the second wave, 11,000 invitations were sent, stratified by gender, age, education, and area of residence. Among those, 2,422 began the survey (22 percent), and among those who responded, 1,217 completed the survey (50.2 percent). We did not screen out any individuals who completed the survey.

1.3 Sample Representativeness

The use of an online survey may raise concerns about the representativeness of our sample with respect to the target population. In order to test representativeness, we compare key demographic characteristics of our study participants with demographic data on the general Jewish Israeli population. We make use of the 2013 Israel Social Survey (ISS), a nationally representative study of the Israeli population administered by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics ($N = 5,844$)¹ among Israelis aged 20 and older.²

Figures 1 through 6 plot the distributions of age, gender, income, education, religiosity, and area of residence in the two samples. It can be seen that in terms of these key variables our sample is representative. While the distributions are not identical, they present similar patterns. In addition, we conducted Chi-squared tests to evaluate the extent to which the two samples can be considered as coming from the same population. For all six variables, we were not able to reject the null hypothesis that the type of sample (i.e., our study or the ISS survey) is independent of the distributions of these variables.

¹The number of observations excludes non-Jewish participants.

²The data were made available by the Israel Social Science Data Center (ISDC) at the Hebrew University.

Figure 1: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Age




Figure 2: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Gender




Figure 3: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Income




Figure 4: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Education




Figure 5: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Religiosity





Figure 6: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Area of Residence




2 Additional Estimations

In this section we provide additional tables and figures to those reported in the main text, including conjoint interaction effects and results for policy support and evaluation in tabular form.

2.1 Evaluating the Effect of Settlements on the Economy and the Likelihood of Peace


Figure 7: Evaluating Policies: Economy and Likelihood of Peace



2.2 Conjoint Interactions

We examine the interaction effects of policy attributes. Following ?, we estimate the effects of combinations of attributes on the probability of policy choice, which go beyond the sum of separate effects of each attribute. In other words, we examine how the interactions of multiple policy outcomes influence the likelihood that a certain policy is chosen. Figure 8 reports the ranges of the causal effects of each domain. Note that the figure reports ranges, and not the average effects themselves. Thus, for the one-way effects, the security domain has more influence than the territory domain, but this is partially driven by the fact that the security domain has two treatments, while the territory domain only has one (see Table ?? in the main text). Observing two-way effects, it can be seen that the interaction of territory and security has a strong additional effect on policy choice, as well as the interaction of security and the economy. The three-way interaction between territory, security, and the economy also has an important influence on policy choice.

Figure 8: Estimated Ranges of One-Way AMCEs and Two-Way and Three-Way AMTIEs



The figure plots estimated ranges of the (one-way) Average Marginal Treatment Component effects (AMCEs), and the two-way and three-way Average Marginal Treatment Interaction Effects (AMTIEs).

2.3 Additional Results Mentioned in the Main Paper

This section reports additional estimations discussed in the main text. Table 5 reports the predicted values used to construct Figure ?? in the main paper. The figure plots predicted values for policy support when holding the conjoint attributes at three specific combinations. For “Keep land (all else good),” we set the Territory indicator to “Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged”; the Security indicator to “Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly”; The Economy indicator to “Israel’s economy will grow significantly”; and the Budget indicator to “The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase.” For “Give land (all else good)” we changed the Territory indicator to “Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank.” Finally, for “Keep land (all else bad)” we set the territory indicator to territorial withdrawal and the other three indicators to “Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly”, “Israel’s economy will be severely harmed,” and “The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease.”

Table 6 reports the results of our ‘credibility’ exercise. The top panel reports the distribution of answers (in percentages) for the question assessing support for concessions at different levels of terrorism risk. The bottom panel reports the distribution of support for ending the occupation in the West bank, at different levels of sanctions risk.

Tables 7 and 8 report the marginal effects of the deepening/loosening indicator in the regressions of policy support and evaluation described in main paper. Table 7 reports the results without demographic controls; Table 8 reports the results by adding controls for age, gender, income, education, area of residence, religiosity, and ethnicity. It can be seen that in all estimations, support for settlement freeze is lower than support settlement expansion, even though settlement freeze is seen as more likely to reduce violence, improve the economy, and increase the likelihood of peace and compromise by the Palestinian Authority.


Table 5: Preferences for Maintaining Territorial Control in Tabular Form

	Estimate	95% Min	95% Max
<i>All</i>			
Keep land (all else good)	0.97	0.93	1.02
Give land (all else good)	0.62	0.57	0.68
Keep land (all else bad)	0.34	0.28	0.40
<i>Right</i>			
Keep land (all else good)	1.00	0.94	1.06
Give land (all else good)	0.41	0.34	0.49
Keep land (all else bad)	0.55	0.47	0.63
<i>Center</i>			
Keep land (all else good)	0.99	0.90	1.08
Give land (all else good)	0.73	0.62	0.84
Keep land (all else bad)	0.22	0.10	0.34
<i>Left</i>			
Keep land (all else good)	0.93	0.82	1.04
Give land (all else good)	1.05	0.93	1.16
Keep land (all else bad)	-0.02	-0.12	0.08

Table 6: Support for Concessions and Risk Taking in Tabular Form

	All	Right	Center	Left
<i>Terrorism risk</i>				
Always support	0.07	0.02	0.05	0.18
5%	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
10%	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02
20%	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.05
30%	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.08
40%	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.07
50%	0.09	0.06	0.14	0.11
60%	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.08
70%	0.09	0.06	0.12	0.12
80%	0.12	0.11	0.13	0.10
90%	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.06
100%	0.14	0.17	0.14	0.05
Never support	0.28	0.40	0.19	0.07
<i>Sanctions risk</i>				
Always support	0.15	0.06	0.11	0.46
5%	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01
10%	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01
20%	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.03
30%	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01
40%	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.04
50%	0.11	0.09	0.15	0.12
60%	0.03	0.01	0.07	0.04
70%	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.04
80%	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.04
90%	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04
100%	0.10	0.12	0.09	0.05
Never support	0.38	0.51	0.27	0.11

Figure 9: Support for Concessions and Risk Taking by Political Bloc



Note: The figure plots the distribution of responses for level of risk survey participants are willing to take when supporting potentially beneficial Israeli concessions, broken by ideological identification.

Table 7: Policy Support and Evaluation (Marginal Effects)

	Coefficient	SE	Pval
<i>Settlements</i>			
Policy support			
Support policy	-0.05	0.04	0.12
Policy evaluation			
Reduce: Short term violence	0.20	0.02	0.00
No change: Short term violence	0.18	0.02	0.00
Increase: Short term violence	-0.38	0.03	0.00
Reduce: Long term violence	0.19	0.02	0.00
No change: Long term violence	0.09	0.02	0.00
Increase: Long term violence	-0.28	0.03	0.00
Harm: Economy	-0.12	0.03	0.00
No change: Economy	0.03	0.01	0.00
Improve: Economy	0.10	0.02	0.00
Reduce: Likelihood of peace	-0.45	0.03	0.00
No change: Likelihood of peace	0.17	0.02	0.00
Increase: Likelihood of peace	0.28	0.02	0.00
Reduce: Likelihood of PA compromise	-0.41	0.03	0.00
No change: Likelihood of PA compromise	0.13	0.02	0.00
Increase: Likelihood of PA compromise	0.27	0.02	0.00

Note: The table reports marginal effects of a binary indicator for territorial loosening, where 1 indicates loosening and 0 denotes deepening.

Table 8: Policy Support and Evaluation (Marginal Effects, Including Controls)

	Coefficient	SE	Pval
<i>Settlements</i>			
Policy support			
Support policy	-0.07	0.04	0.07
Policy evaluation			
Reduce: Short term violence	0.19	0.02	0.00
No change: Short term violence	0.17	0.03	0.00
Increase: Short term violence	-0.36	0.03	0.00
Reduce: Long term violence	0.20	0.03	0.00
No change: Long term violence	0.08	0.02	0.00
Increase: Long term violence	-0.28	0.03	0.00
Harm: Economy	-0.10	0.03	0.00
No change: Economy	0.02	0.01	0.02
Improve: Economy	0.08	0.03	0.00
Reduce: Likelihood of peace	-0.44	0.03	0.00
No change: Likelihood of peace	0.16	0.03	0.00
Increase: Likelihood of peace	0.28	0.03	0.00
Reduce: Likelihood of PA compromise	-0.40	0.03	0.00
No change: Likelihood of PA compromise	0.12	0.02	0.00
Increase: Likelihood of PA compromise	0.28	0.03	0.00

Note: The table reports marginal effects of a binary indicator for territorial loosening, where 1 indicates loosening and 0 denotes deepening.

3 First Wave Survey Design and Results

3.1 Policy Vignettes

Similar to the second wave, the first wave showed participants a simulated news article regarding Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank. Unlike the second wave, which varied only along the territorial deepening–loosening dimension, the first wave also varied along a government identity dimension, which was manipulated to be either hawkish or dovish. After reading the policy vignette, respondents were asked to state their level of support for the policy, ranging from “strongly oppose” to “strongly support.” They were also asked to evaluate whether the policy is expected to worsen, leave unchanged, or improve the following outcomes: 1) Palestinian violence; 2) the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement with the Palestinians, and 3) the position of the Palestinian Authority in negotiations. The prompt for the policy vignettes, as well as the policy evaluation questions, were almost identical to the second wave described in the main paper.³

Settlements (loosening): *The construction of settlements in the West Bank was frozen yesterday. The construction freeze is expected to continue in the near future. The settlement freeze was implemented in accordance with the decision of the political-security cabinet, composed primarily of ministers from [right/left] wing parties. A political official said that the settlement freeze promotes Israel’s national interests, and is consistent with Israel’s commitment to strive for a just and sustainable peace.*

Settlements (deepening): *In the last few months there has been a sharp increase in settlements construction in the West Bank. This increase is expected to continue in the near future. The accelerated construction was done in accordance with the decision of the political-security cabinet, composed primarily of ministers from [right/left] wing parties. A political official said that the increase in settlement construction promotes Israel’s national interests and does not contradict its commitment to strive for a just and sustainable peace.*

3.2 First Wave Results

Figure 10 reports participants’ evaluation of the effects of the two settlement policies on levels of violence, likelihood of peace, and the likelihood of compromise by the Palestinian Authority in negotiations. We estimated predicted probabilities for each outcome from an ordered logit model in which the main treatment is an indicator variable for territorial deepening or loosening, and the outcome is a three-category variable indicating how the policy affects each outcome (reduce; no change; or increase). Figure 10 displays predicted probabilities calculated for the “bad” outcomes:

³The only difference is in the policy evaluation questions, where we measured the outcomes with five potential answers, instead of three in the second wave.

increase violence and decrease likelihood of peace and PA compromise. It can be seen that for all outcomes, respondents expected that deepening territorial control through settlement expansion would lead to significantly more harmful outcomes than freezing settlement construction. Similar to the results found in the second wave (reported in the main paper), most respondents believed that deepening territorial control will increase violence, decrease the likelihood of peace, and decrease the likelihood of a compromise by the Palestinian Authority in negotiations.

Figure 10: Evaluating Policies (First Wave)





Figure 11 reports levels of support for settlements expansion and settlement freeze by ideological self-placement. We regressed an indicator of policy support on an interaction of the territorial deepening/loosening indicator (i.e., whether respondents were randomly assigned to loosening or a deepening vignette) and a variable measuring respondents' self-placement on a seven points ideological (left-right) scale. As found in the results of the second wave (reported in the main paper), we find that political ideology impacts support for settlement expansion. As one moves right on the political self-placement scale, the more likely is it that he or she will support settlement expansion. Individuals identifying as the left (1-3 on the ideological scale) support settlement freezing far more than settlement construction. Centrist individuals (4 on the scale) equally support both types of policies; and right-wing respondents (5-7 on the self-placed ideological scale) support settlement

construction significantly more than settlement freeze.


Figure 11: Support for Conciliatory and Coercive Policies (First Wave)



We ran the same analysis for policy evaluation. Figures 12, 13, and 14 show that individuals identifying as center and left believe that settlement expansion is far more harmful than settlement freeze in all domains: violence, likelihood of peace, and likelihood of PA compromise in negotiations. These results are very similar to the results found in the second wave (reported in the main paper). This further strengthens the argument that the policy positions of center-left in Israel is shaped by instrumental and security considerations.

As can be seen in Figures 12 and 13, right-wing respondents also tend to view settlement expansion as more likely to increase violence and decrease the likelihood of peace than settlement freeze, but the difference is of a smaller magnitude, compared to the views of the left and the center. There is a small subset of far-right respondents (about 20%) who believes that settlement freeze would be more harmful than settlement expansion in increasing violence and reducing the chances of peace. However, this is a relatively small group to drive the overwhelming support for settlement expansion among the right. Figure 14 shows that right-wing respondents do not believe that settlement expansion would be different from settlement freeze in affecting the likelihood of the Palestinian Authority's position in negotiations.

Figure 12: Evaluating Policies: Violence (First Wave)



Overall, the findings of the first wave are consistent with the results of the second wave: we find that respondents believe that settlement expansion is less effective than settlement freeze in reducing violence, promoting peace, and moderating the Palestinian position in negotiations. At the same time, a majority supports settlement expansion significantly more than settlement freeze. Breaking the results by ideological self-placement, we find that the results are driven by right-wing individuals, similar to the results found in the second wave. The consistency between the two waves is notable not only because of the similarity in the findings, but also because they were fielded on different samples at very different time periods: the first wave was conducted during a relatively peaceful time during the Kerry negotiations, while the second was collected a few months after the 2014 Gaza conflict.

Figure 13: Evaluating Policies: Likelihood of Peace (First Wave)





Table 9: Policy Support and Evaluation: First Wave (Marginal Effects)

	Coefficient	SE	Pval
<i>Settlements</i>			
Policy support			
Support policy	-0.14	0.04	0.00
Policy evaluation			
Reduce: Violence	0.17	0.02	0.00
No change: Violence	0.15	0.02	0.00
Increase: Violence	-0.32	0.04	0.00
Reduce: Likelihood of peace	-0.29	0.03	0.00
No change: Likelihood of peace	0.08	0.02	0.00
Increase: Likelihood of peace	0.21	0.03	0.00
Reduce: Likelihood of PA compromise	-0.25	0.04	0.00
No change: Likelihood of PA compromise	0.10	0.02	0.00
Increase: Likelihood of PA compromise	0.15	0.02	0.00

Note: The table reports marginal effects of a binary indicator for territorial loosening, where 1 indicates loosening and 0 denotes deepening.

Figure 14: Evaluating Policies: Likelihood of PA Compromise (First Wave)



4 Second Wave Survey Instrument and Coding Rules

Policy Vignettes

“In this part you will be asked to read a short paragraph followed by several news stories regarding policies enacted by the Israeli government. The stories are hypothetical, but they are based on similar stories published previously in the press. At the end of each news story you will be asked to answer several questions.

According to the Israeli Central Statistics Bureau, the Israeli population in 2013 numbered approximately 8,000,000 people. Of these, about 300,000 Israelis live in about 120 settlements constructed outside the Green Line, in the Territories of the West Bank. In addition, approximately 2,264,000 Palestinians live in these Territories. Israeli citizens constitute 10% of the population of the West Bank and Palestinians constitute 90%.”

Settlements (loosening): *Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank has been halted yesterday. The settlement freeze is expected to continue in the near future. Experts estimate that halting the construction will significantly improve Palestinian livelihood. A government source said that the policy was enacted in accordance with the Israeli Security Cabinet, and mentioned that it advances Israel’s national interests and is aligned with Israel’s commitment to just and long lasting peace.*

Settlements (deepening): *In the last quarter there has been a sharp increase in settlement construction in the West Bank. The construction is expected to continue in the near future. Experts estimate that the accelerated construction will significantly harm Palestinian livelihood. A government source said that the policy was enacted in accordance with the Israeli Security Cabinet, and mentioned that it advances Israel’s national interests and is aligned with Israel’s commitment to just and long lasting peace.*

1. What is your position about the policy described in the news story?

- Strongly oppose
- Oppose
- Support
- Strongly support

2. In your opinion, how would the policy affect Palestinian violence in the short term?

- The policy will significantly reduce Palestinian violence in the short term
- The policy will not affect levels of Palestinian violence in the short term

- The policy will significantly increase Palestinian violence in the short term
3. In your opinion, how would the policy affect Palestinian violence in the long term?
- The policy will significantly reduce Palestinian violence in the long term
 - The policy will not affect levels of Palestinian violence in the long term
 - The policy will significantly increase Palestinian violence in the long term
4. In your opinion, how would the policy affect the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement with the Palestinians?
- The policy will significantly reduce the likelihood of reaching an agreement
 - The policy will not affect the likelihood of reaching an agreement
 - The policy will significantly increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement
5. In your opinion, how would the policy affect the position of the Palestinian Authority in negotiations?
- The policy will significantly harden the Palestinian Authority's position in negotiations
 - The policy will not affect the position of the Palestinian Authority in negotiations
 - The policy will significantly soften the Palestinian Authority's position in negotiations
6. In your opinion, how would the policy affect the Israeli economy?
- The policy will harm the Israeli economy
 - The policy will not affect the Israeli economy
 - The policy will strengthen the Israeli economy

Risk Questions

1. *Terrorism risk.* Imagine that the Israeli government is considering a number of far-reaching gestures to strengthen the Palestinian Authority. These measures have an advantage and a disadvantage: On the one hand, they could lead to a substantial reduction in terrorism, of about 100 attacks a year, due to improved security cooperation with the Palestinians. On the other hand, should the gestures fail, they could strengthen Hamas and increase terrorism by about 30 attacks a year. Please indicate when you would support the political gestures based solely on the information given in the question.
- I will support the gestures in any case
 - I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 5%
 - I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 10%

- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 20%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 30%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 40%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 50%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 60%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 70%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 80%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 90%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 100%
- I will not support the gestures under any circumstance

2. *Sanctions risk.* In the current political situation, Israel earns approximately a billion dollars a year from international trade. Recently, the U.N. Security Council was considering sanctions due to ongoing military occupation of the Occupied Territories. A team of senior experts estimated that implementation of the sanctions would lead to annual losses of 300 million dollars a year for the Israeli economy. The sanctions could be prevented by ending the occupation through mutual agreement with the Palestinians. Considering the risk of sanctions, when would you support such an agreement?

- I will support such an agreement in any case
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 5%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 10%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 20%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 30%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 40%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 50%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 60%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 70%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 80%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 90%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 100%
- I will not support the agreement under any circumstance

Political Ideology

1. *Self-reported ideology.* It is common to talk about politics in Israel in terms of Political Left and Right. Where would you place yourself on the Political Left-Right continuum below?
(Right) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Left)
2. *Preferred solution to the conflict.* Everyone in Israel has a general idea of how to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Which one of the following options is your preferred solution to the conflict, even if the chance of it being successful is currently somewhat low?
 - Establishment of a Palestinian state next to Israel in the framework of a peace agreement.
 - One-sided withdrawal from the West Bank territories, with continued sovereignty in the settlements.
 - One state that grants full citizenship to all its residents, Jewish and Palestinian.
 - Encouraging the Palestinians to transfer to other countries.
 - The Area C annexation plan, granting autonomy to Palestinians in areas A and B
 - Maintaining the status quo
 - Other
3. *Voting.* Which party did you vote for in the January 2013 elections?
 - Likud
 - Israel Beiteinu
 - Labor Party
 - The Jewish Home
 - Shas
 - Am Shalem
 - United Torah Judaism
 - Meretz
 - Hatnuah
 - Yesh Atid
 - Kadima
 - Otzma LeYisrael
 - Hadash
 - The Greens / Ale Yarok
 - Eretz Hadasha
 - Other
 - I did not vote

Demographic Questions

1. Area of residence:

- Jerusalem
- The West Bank
- Tel-Aviv
- The center
- Haifa
- The north
- The south
- The Shfela
- The Sharon

Dichotomized into: 1. Jerusalem and West Bank; 0. All else

2. What is your highest education attainment?

- No matriculation
- High school
- Vocational
- Academic

Dichotomized into: 1. Academics; 0. All else

3. The average monthly gross per capita income in Israel is about 8,800 NIS. Is your income:

- Much less than the average
- Little less than the average
- Like the average
- Little more than the average
- Much more than the average

Dichotomized into: 1. Average and above; 0. Below average

4. How religious are you?

- Secular
- Traditional
- Religious

- Haredi

Dichotomized into: 1. Traditional, Religious, Haredi; 0. Secular

5. What is your ethnic origin?

- Mizrachi
- Ashkenazi
- A mixed ethnic origin
- Former Soviet Union
- Ethiopia
- Other

Dichotomized into: 1. Mizrachi; 0. Ashkenazi