Contested Ground: Disentangling Material and Symbolic Attachment to Territory

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Abstract

A large literature argues that territorial disputes are prone to conflict because of the value of territory to publics, whether due to its strategic and material worth, or to its intangible, symbolic value. Yet despite the implications of the distinction for both theory and policy, empirically disentangling the material from the symbolic has posed a formidable methodological challenge. We propose a method for assessing the nature of individual territorial attachment, drawing on a series of survey experiments in Israel. Our empirical analysis illustrates how the distribution of territorial preferences in the domestic population can have powerful implications for conflict and its resolution.

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Introduction

One of the most durable findings in the study of international security is the link between territory and political violence. A majority of interstate wars and a large share of intrastate wars are fought over territory (Toft, 2014; Vasquez and Henehan, 2011). Territorial disputes are associated not only with conflict onset but with its escalation (Braithwaite and Lemke, 2011) and duration (Fuhrmann and Tir, 2009), and have been shown to be significantly more difficult to resolve (Fearon, 2004; Miller and Gibler, 2011; Walter, 2003).

Two competing explanations have been offered for this robust empirical association: The first emphasizes territory’s tangible value, conferring resources (Hensel, 2001), strategic advantage (Carter, 2010), or other benefits (Goertz and Diehl, 1992). Though a bargaining space should theoretically exist when stakes are material, such bargains tend to fail in practice due to credible commitment problems (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006) – the fear that a rival will renege on an agreement, exploiting concessions to extract heavy costs. A second theory attributes the link between land and conflict to the unique hold territory is said to have on individuals, for biological, historical, ideological, or religious reasons. In this view, individuals value territory for its symbolic worth that exceeds tangible concerns, leading politicians to highlight intangible dimensions in order to mobilize support (Huth, 1996; Senese, 2005; Toft, 2006; Tir, 2010; Vasquez, 2009; Wright and Diehl, 2014). Consequently, any bargaining space that involves tangible tradeoffs is closed, rendering the territory effectively indivisible (Goddard, 2006).

These two theories implicitly assume a unitary state concerned either with rival credibility or intangible stakes. In reality, however, states are composed of individuals with diverse attitudes towards territory. Analyzing this domestic heterogeneity is important for understanding the barriers to territorial conflict resolution. To illustrate, consider an extreme case in which an overwhelming majority of the population opposes concessions due to concerns about rival credibility. Here, an appropriate policy prescription would be to devise mechanisms that enhance the credibility of commitments, such as mediation or arbitration (Gent and Shannon, 2010; Kydd, 2006). These mechanisms will be of limited use, however, in the converse situation, where an overwhelming majority of the population values territory for intangible reasons and is far less concerned with the tangible risks and benefits of compromise.

The assessment of heterogeneity in territorial attitudes has posed a thorny empirical challenge, however. Many disputed territories have both tangible and intangible value, making the sources of individual attachment difficult to trace. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict over
the West Bank is a paradigmatic example: On the one hand, the territory is strategically valuable, providing Israel with some territorial depth. Indeed, a common claim made by individuals who oppose territorial concessions is that Israel’s population centers and key strategic sites would be directly threatened should the West Bank be taken over by groups hostile to Israel. On the other hand, the West Bank holds religious and historical significance as part of the biblical land of Israel, giving it symbolic value that extends beyond strategic considerations. This dual value is reflected in the commonly used Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) dataset, which assigns high tangible and intangible salience to the West Bank, as well as to many of the world’s other disputed territories.

This article proposes a method for overcoming this challenge and disentangling the material and symbolic dimensions of territorial attachment. We argue that intangibility and tangibility are more fruitfully thought of as characteristics of preferences rather than of land, and proceed to investigate these preferences. Drawing on a series of original survey experiments in Israel we show, first, how territorial attachment varies in the population, and second, how this variation constrains policy makers and affects the ability to bargain over territory. The Israeli case is especially suitable for illustrating our method since the West Bank has long been framed, even by the very same politicians, in both strategic and symbolic terms. Assessing which account is more compelling to individual voters is therefore not a straightforward task.

We find that a majority of Israelis is willing to pay substantial material costs to deepen territorial control. While some of these individuals are concerned with rival credibility and the resulting risks of territorial compromise, a substantial segment of the Jewish population (approximately 30%-40%, far more than previously thought) is attached to territory for ideological, intangible reasons. We further find that this heterogeneity in territorial attachment is crucial for shaping the prospects of conflict resolution, as voters with intangible attachment to territory form a substantial share of the constituents of Israel’s current largest political party. This suggests that public opinion in the Israeli case impedes peaceful conflict resolution, as territorial compromise would be an extremely risky political move. The analysis demonstrates the importance and utility of empirically distinguishing between material and symbolic territorial attachment: while public opinion does not, in every case, determine the security policies that leaders adopt, the preferences of domestic audiences, at least in democratic settings, pose a powerful constraint that can be difficult for leaders to overcome (Tomz and Weeks, 2013).

Our study contributes to the literature on territorial conflict in several ways. First, it provides a set of tools for disentangling material and symbolic attachment that can be
exported to other conflict settings, providing leverage on a longstanding methodological challenge. Second, our study provides micro-foundations for theoretical work on territorial conflict, shedding light on the mechanisms that lead to conflict entrenchment. As such, we contribute to a growing research program that uses experiments to test the domestic micro-foundations of International Relations theories (see Hyde, 2015, for a review).

More generally the study contributes to research on the role of self-interest and symbolic beliefs in shaping policy preferences. Research conducted primarily in the American context finds that values, or predispositions formed early in life, are better predictors of preferences than self-interest based on cost-benefit calculations (Lau and Heldman, 2009; Sears and Funk, 1991). However, the frequent overlap between the two makes it difficult to disentangle their effects using standard multivariate models (Chong, Citrin and Conley, 2001). Scholars have employed a number of means to address this problem, such as limiting the definition of self-interest to immediate benefits to individuals or their families (Chong, Citrin and Conley, 2001). This solution is unsatisfactory for assessment of conflict-related attitudes, which by definition are concerned with the collective risk of future conflict.

Finally, our study contributes to research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has long recognized that some members of the population are “ideological” and others are “instrumental,” but has struggled to establish the distribution of these preferences in the population and consequently to assess its political implications. Work by Ginges et al. (2007) has employed experiments to disentangle the two dimensions, but has focused only a narrow, ideological subset of the population – Israeli settlers – and has not shown how the overall distribution of domestic preferences shapes the bargaining space available to leaders. By doing so, we are able to uncover to an important domestic processes through which public attitudes affect conflict resolution.

**Theoretical Background**

Across many contexts, territory has been found to be associated with interstate conflict onset, escalation, and recurrence (Diehl, 1999; Gibler, 2012; Hensel, 2012; Huth, 1996). Territorial disputes also lead to intrastate conflicts (Kahler, 2006), especially ethnic conflicts fought over territorial control (Toft, 2014). Yet while the relationship between territory and conflict has long been observed, the factors leading to it are less clear. In general, existing explanations are of two varieties: a rationalist, tangible approach, and an approach focusing on intangible value.
The starting point of the first approach is that states are utility-maximizing. Territory is particularly valuable in this view, as it is associated with a range of material benefits, from strategic importance to economic resources (Carter 2010; Goertz and Diehl 1992). In principle, the tangible value of territory should not make it more conflict-prone, since material stakes are divisible, allowing for a bargain to be reached, whether through partition or through other creative arrangements (Fearon 1995). There are, however, a number of reasons that a bargain may nevertheless fail. Most prominent of these is the commitment problem: since territory is a valuable resource, the initially weaker party cannot credibly commit to not exploit the increased power associated with territorial concessions to extract further concessions (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006). This problem applies not just to interstate conflict but to intrastate ones (Walter 1997), motivating a large number of studies on the mechanisms enhancing commitment credibility, such as third party guarantees, power-sharing institutions, and forced separation (e.g. Walter 1997; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003).

Arguing that the intrinsic value of territory accounts for only a relatively small number of territorial conflicts (Diehl 1992; Huth 1996), the second approach focuses on territory’s intangible salience to domestic audiences. One strand of this literature attributes the presumed intangible value of territory to the genetic predisposition of humans to be territorial. In this view, humans, like other animals, are biologically programmed to keep and protect a territory they perceive as theirs, and are thus more likely to go to war over territorial disputes than other issues (Vasquez 1993; Johnson and Toft 2014). A different strand highlights ideology and identity, arguing that the roots of collective identity are grounded in particular homelands (Shelef 2015; Forsberg 1996; Hensel 2012). Newman (1999, 2006), for example, argues that attachment to territory is primordial, an element in the formation of group identity forged through a historic process that imbues land with historical, mythical, or religious meaning. Making a similar argument with regard to ethnic conflict, Toft (2003, 2006) suggests that ethnic groups are defined by association with a particular territorial homeland, and that this association is vital to their group existence. Hassner (2003), on the other hand, traces symbolic attachment to land to the religious sanctity of particular spaces, rather than to ethnic or national affinities.

Whether the source of territorial attachment is genetic, primordial or constructed (or some combination of these), the key notion underlying theories of intangible attachment is that territorial conflicts are not a function of territory’s intrinsic worth. If territory is valued simply for the instrumental benefits associated with its control, or for the desire to avoid

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1 A second explanation, asymmetric information, is less relevant in cases of protracted conflict (Powell 2006).
instrumental costs associated with its loss, a hypothetical bargaining space exists that allows rivals to avoid costly conflict. Rather, it is intangible attachment that renders the territory effectively indivisible. As Toft (2006, 46) argues, “People who live there think of the land - its occupation and control - as a part of themselves. Divide it or share its control and you may as well hack off an arm or leg.”

These sort of attachments toward disputed territories, it is argued, play a key role in shaping the calculations of leaders. Vasquez’s (1993) steps-to-war theory describes a dynamic in which elites capitalize on territorial attachment to mobilize public opinion as the conflict escalates, reducing their bargaining space as domestic audiences become more willing to bear conflict’s costs. Similarly, Goddard (2006) argues that territory is strategically constructed as indivisible by political actors to appeal to domestic audiences and build broader coalitions. Over time, rival actors become locked into these positions, and deviation from them becomes politically impossible.

Importantly, these two approaches to territorial conflict are typically posited as mutually exclusive, involving unifying assumptions about the nature of territorial attachment. Accordingly, they are usually tested at the cross-national level, employing measures designed to capture the value of territory. The Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) dataset, for example, which includes proxy measures for tangible and intangible issue salience, is designed to allow researchers to examine which issue (territorial, in this case) is more likely to be associated with conflict (Hensel and Mitchell 2005). More recently Shelef (2015) developed a different measure of intangibility, in which territories are coded as homelands if they were referred to as such in the discourse of domestic actors.

In practice, however, many of the world’s most disputed territories hold both tangible and intangible value. Indeed, tangible territorial stakes are often infused with intangible value over time (Vasquez and Valeriano, 2008). In order to disentangle the role of the tangible and the symbolic in driving particular conflicts, it is therefore more useful to examine these dimensions as characteristics of preferences rather than of territories. This requires a shift to micro-level analysis, and to methods that allow separating tangible interests from symbolic beliefs.

As a first step, we outline the micro-level implications of territorial conflict theories in order to formulate hypotheses that can be tested empirically. The rationalist approach does not invoke domestic mechanisms directly but has straightforward implications for public opinion, at least in democratic settings where the public’s policy preferences pose an important constraint on the the bargaining space of leaders (Chaudoin 2014, Snyder and Borghard 2011). The logic of the rationalist approach implies that individuals will value
territory if they perceive that the expected net benefits of territorial control are higher than
the expected net benefits of territorial concessions. When evaluating the relative costs and
benefits of territorial control versus territorial concessions, voters factor in concerns about
the ability of the rival to credibly commit to an agreement.  

The symbolic approach, in contrast, view territorial attachment as intangible. Intangibility—
i.e., the appeal to emotive, ideological, or symbolic value—can be thought as useful theoret-
ical construct only to the extent that political preferences cannot be explained by pointing
to material or security gains. Thus, the core implication of this approach is that publics
are willing to bear substantial material costs to retain territorial control. In other words,
intangible attachment to land would be reflected in public support for territorial control
even when such control adversely affects various aspects of individuals’ lives, such as their
material welfare or security.

Both of these approaches may in principle account for individual attachment to disputed
territory. To assess which is more dominant, we develop a set of original survey questions
that allow us to disentangle the material from the symbolic and examine how attachment
affects conflict entrenchment in the Israeli-Palestinian case.

Data and Method

We designed a series of original survey experiments and fielded them online to a sample of
3,180 Jewish Israeli voters. The surveys were administered in two waves. The first wave,
conducted in April 2014, included a sample of 1,963 adult Israelis stratified by gender, age,
religiosity, and residence. It was designed to assess the reaction of Israelis to various policies,
randomly assigning respondents to descriptions of policies that deepen or alleviate territorial
control. The second wave was administered in January 2015 to a sample of 1,217 respondents,
stratified by gender, age, education and residence. Summary statistics of both samples are
reported in Tables A.1 and A.2. The two survey waves took place in different contextual

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2This process is at least partially endogenous, as it is likely that leaders themselves contribute to public
concerns through messages on the risks of rival defection.
3The surveys were administered by iPanel, Israel’s largest opt-in Internet survey firm, which uses quota
sampling to generate samples that conform to the demographics of the Israeli Jewish population. Panel
members collect points for responding to surveys, which they can then redeem for gift certificates.
4In the first wave, the survey company invited 13,226 individuals to participate, and among those, 2,697
began the survey (20.4 percent). Among those who responded, 1,963 completed the first wave (72.8 percent).
In the second wave, 11,000 invitations were sent, and 2,422 began the survey (22 percent). Among those
who responded, 1,217 completed the survey (50.2 percent).
5The distribution of age, gender, income, education, religiosity, and area of residence of our sample is
equivalent to the their distribution among the Israeli Jewish population; see SI section 1.3.
environments. The first was conducted in the relatively peaceful months of negotiations led by United States Secretary of State John Kerry. The second survey was fielded a few months after the collapse of the negotiations, and in the wake of the bloody conflict in Gaza 2014, which killed more than 2,100 Palestinians and 72 Israelis.6

Our research design consists of three distinct survey measures with two related objectives. First, we establish which Israelis are attached to the West Bank and identify when this attachment is primarily driven by tangible concerns, and when it is driven by intangible concerns. To do so, we present all of our results disaggregated by political ideology, measured using the respondent’s self placement on a seven-point ideological (left-right) scale. Next, we illustrate the importance of this analysis by showing how the overall distribution of preferences in the population constrains the bargaining space of Israeli leaders. For clarity of presentation, we discuss each survey measure separately.

Experiment I: Public attitudes towards territorial control

The first part of our analysis was designed to identify the share of Israelis that are attached to the West Bank and to gauge whether the policy position of those supporting territorial control is rooted in perceived tangible benefits. We utilize attitudes towards Israel’s settlement policy as an indicator of territorial attachment, since settlement construction is motivated by the desire to deepen the control of the disputed territory, and because it is understood both in Israel and by the international community as a key obstacle to a territorial compromise between Israelis and Palestinians. A settlement freeze, in contrast, indicates an implicit recognition by the Israeli government that sovereignty over the West Bank is, at the very least, disputed.

In both survey waves, participants first read the following text: “You will now be asked to read a brief background paragraph and then a number of reports about the actions of the Israeli government. The reports are hypothetical, but are based on similar reports published in the news in the past. At the end of each news report you’ll be asked to answer a number of questions.” Respondents then read the following brief description of the situation in the West Bank: “According to the Israeli Central Statistics Bureau, the Israeli population in 2013 numbered approximately 8,000,000 people. Of these, about 300,000 Israelis live in about 120 settlements constructed outside the Green Line, in the territories of Judea and Samarea.

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In addition, approximately 2,264,000 Palestinians live in these Territories. Israeli citizens constitute 10% of the population of the West Bank and Palestinians constitute 90%.”

Next, participants were presented with simulated news reports concerning Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank, designed to conform as closely as possible to actual news articles from recent years. We randomly varied whether territorial control was deepened or loosened, by exposing half of respondents to a policy increasing the construction of settlements, and the other half to a policy freezing the construction of settlements. The full text of the vignette follows:

Settlement freeze  Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank was frozen yesterday. The settlement freeze is expected to continue in the near future. Experts estimate that freezing construction will significantly improve Palestinian livelihood. A government source said that the policy was enacted in accordance with a decision by the Israeli Security Cabinet, and stated that it advances Israel’s national interests and is aligned with Israel’s commitment to pursue a just and long lasting peace.

Settlement expansion  In the last quarter there has been a sharp increase in settlement construction in the West Bank. The construction is expected to continue in the near future. Experts estimate that the accelerated construction will significantly harm Palestinian livelihood. A government source said that the policy was enacted in accordance with a decision by the Israeli Security Cabinet, and stated that it advances Israel’s national interests and is aligned with Israel’s commitment to pursue a just and long lasting peace.

After reading the policy vignette, respondents were first asked to state whether or not they support the government policy (“policy support”), and second, their assessment of the policy’s likely consequences for several tangible outcomes that are central to the public’s discourse regarding the fate of the West Bank: levels of violence, the state of the economy, and the likelihood of peace (“policy evaluation”). To measure policy support, respondents stated their level of support for the policy on a four-point scale ranging from “strongly oppose” to “strongly support.” To measure policy evaluation, respondents were asked to evaluate whether the policy is expected to worsen, leave unchanged, or improve each of the following outcomes: (1) Palestinian violence in the short-term; (2) Palestinian violence in the long-term; (3) the state of the Israeli economy; (4) the likelihood of reaching a peace

7In both waves we also ask about other policies not directly associated with territorial control. These policy vignettes are analyzed elsewhere. In the second wave, the results of the territorial control question are based on a sample of 813 respondents.
agreement with the Palestinians.

Results

To determine levels of support for the two opposing settlement policies, we regress our variable of policy support on an expansion/freeze indicator. We use a binary variable that is equal to one if the respondent supports the policy described in the vignette and zero otherwise. Notably, results from our first wave are consistent with those of the second, despite surveying different samples in very different political climates. In the interest of brevity, we report findings from our second wave survey here and present results of the first wave in Section 3 of the SI.

Figure 1 shows that the majority of respondents exposed to the settlement construction vignette, 53%, express support for that policy. In contrast, a smaller share of respondents, 47%, express support for a settlement freeze. This difference is notable given the well-known opposition of Palestinians and the international community to Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and their role in making territorial comprise exceedingly difficult to achieve. However, these results in themselves do not reveal why respondents are more likely to support settlement construction: because they view it as less costly than settlement freezing, or because they support it despite its costs.

We therefore turn to an examination of public assessment of each policy’s consequences. Do respondents believe that territorial control enhances their security or benefits the country materially, or do they view the policy as costly? For each outcome examined, we estimate and plot predicted probabilities for an ordered logit model in which the main treatment is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for settlement expansion and 0 for a settlement freeze. In all models, the dependent variable can take one of three categories, corresponding to the policy’s expected effect on each outcome: worsen, leave unchanged, or improve. We present predicted probabilities for the “worsen” outcome.

Figure 2 reports respondents’ evaluation of the effects of the two opposing settlement policies. For all four outcomes, deepening territorial control through settlement expansion is judged as significantly more harmful than a policy that freezes settlement construction: the majority of our sample expects that deepening territorial control will increase short-term violence and decrease the likelihood of peace. In addition, a plurality of respondents believes that settlement expansion will increase long-term violence and be harmful to the economy.

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8Our findings are similar when estimating ordered logit models using the four-point scale, as described in the SI.
These findings stand in stark contrast to the support for settlement expansion expressed by a majority of respondents, suggesting a puzzling question: why would most of the public support the deepening of territorial control when, at the same time, it believes that such a policy is likely to increase violence, harm the economy and reduce the likelihood of peaceful resolution of a protracted bloody conflict?

One possibility is that the majority of Israel’s Jewish population holds intangible attachment to the disputed land. However, we argue that making such inference from aggregate results can be misleading, as it may reflect an ecological fallacy: perhaps the minority that opposes policies that deepen territorial control views settlement expansion extremely negatively, while the majority that supports the policy has weak positive expectations. In order to examine this possibility we rerun the analysis for policy support and policy evaluation, interacting our treatment variable—whether respondents were randomly assigned to a settlement expansion or freeze vignette—with respondent’s political ideology, which we expect is strongly correlated with their attitudes towards settlements.

Figure 3 confirms that, as expected, political ideology crucially determines support for settlement expansion. Whereas for those identifying as the left (1-3 on the ideological scale) and the center (ideology scale equals 4), support for settlement freezing is far higher than
for settlement construction, the opposite is true among right-wing Jewish Israelis (4-7 on the self-placed ideological scale). Notably, a majority of respondents (53%) self-identified as right-wing, as compared to only 22% of the sample that identified as left-wing.9.

We now turn to examine policy evaluation by political ideology. Figure 4 shows that the center-left views settlement expansion as more likely than settlement freezing to increase short and long term violence.10 This provides a rather strong indication that the center-left policy position, which opposes deepening territorial control and believes that it will have negative consequences, is crucially shaped by tangible—material and security—considerations, as predicted by rationalist theories.

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9This is consistent with Israeli polling data, see for example the latest Peace Index poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute and Tel Aviv University at [http://en.idi.org.il/tools-and-data/the-guttman-center-for-public-opinion-and-policy-research/the-peace-index/](http://en.idi.org.il/tools-and-data/the-guttman-center-for-public-opinion-and-policy-research/the-peace-index/).

10Results for the state of the economy and the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement are presented in the SI. Patterns are generally similar, with the exception of a relatively small subset of far-right respondents that views a settlement freeze as more harmful for the economy. This does not seem to be large enough to explain the overwhelming support for settlement expansion among the far right, as we further demonstrate in the next section.
Interestingly, the policy assessment patterns of the Right are not very different than those of the Center-Left (though smaller in magnitude). Right-wing respondents, too, believe that policies that deepen territorial control are more likely to escalate conflict. These perceptions, by a solid majority of the Israeli electorate, stand in remarkable contrast to their support for deepening territorial control. We examine the reasons for these seemingly counterintuitive preferences in the next section.
Figure 4: Evaluation of Territorial Policy: Violence

Increase short-term violence

Predicted values

Increase long-term violence

Predicted values

Ideological self-placement
Experiment 2: Intangible Stakes or the Commitment Problem? Explaining Costly Policy Preferences

The fact that right-wing respondents support policies that they view as likely to escalate conflict is in principle consistent with both rationalist and symbolic theories. From a rationalist perspective, it may be that individuals support costly policies due to the risk that even greater costs would result from rival defection. From a symbolic perspective, this share of the population might view territory as salient beyond its strategic and material value. To separate the two, we utilize a conjoint experiment designed to disentangle the influence of various policy attributes on generating support for that policy (Shamir and Shamir [1995]). We asked participants to consider a hypothetical scenario in which the Israeli government is considering implementing one of two policies that may substantially change the Israeli-Palestinian status quo. After a brief introduction explaining the task, we showed participants possible attributes of two generic policies (“A” and “B”) as shown in Table 1. The instructions asked participants to imagine that the government is turning to the public to decide between the two policies in a plebiscite and indicate which of the two policy proposals they would support.

Each policy had four attributes that varied along the domains that are central to policy debates in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the policy’s effect on security, the economy, budget allocation to social services versus defense, and control over the disputed territory. Each attribute took one of several values, as described in Table 2. For example, the policy’s impact on security was operationalized as its effect on terrorist and rocket attacks, since this has been perceived by Israel as the primary threat to its security since the decline of the conventional military threat posed to it by its neighbors after the end of the Cold War. Values on this item ranged from a substantial decrease in rockets and terrorist attacks to a substantial increase in such attacks. In the territorial domain, values varied between maintaining territorial control of the West Bank and withdrawing from the territory.

This approach has several unique features. First, the random assignment of policy attributes enables identification of the causal effect of each attribute on the probability of policy support. This allows us to disentangle policy attributes that are naturally correlated, such as security and territorial control. Second, we measure the effect of all attributes on the same scale, which allows us to assess the relative importance of each attribute. Together these features make it possible to estimate whether or not respondents value territory above

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11 A second strategic threat, that of a nuclear Iran, is irrelevant to the territorial control of the West Bank.
12 See SI, Section 1.1, for balance tests for each domain in the conjoint experiment.
a variety of strategic and material benefits.

Following Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014), we calculate average marginal component effects (AMCEs), which estimate the average difference in the probability that a policy with a given outcome—say, a reduction in rocket attacks—is preferred over a policy with a baseline outcome—such as no change in the level of rocket attacks. Since the attributes (i.e., the outcomes) of a policy are randomly assigned, each outcome in a given domain is combined with the same distribution of outcomes in the other domains on average, which allows for a simple comparison of mean values. We estimate the AMCEs using a regression of a binary outcome variable: Policy chosen on a set of factor variables for each outcome in each domain. Since each respondent chooses between two policies, there are two possible policy profiles for each respondent. To obtain accurate standard errors, we cluster standard errors by respondent ID.

\[
Policy \ chosen_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_{i,2} + \beta_2 S_{i,2} + \beta_3 S_{i,3} + \beta_4 E_{i,2} + \beta_5 E_{i,3} + \beta_6 B_{i,2} + \beta_7 B_{i,3} + \epsilon_i
\] (1)
Table 1: Experimental Design

After the recent military operation in Gaza, the Israeli government came to the conclusion that it needs to take an action that may have a strong impact on Israel’s economy, security, and social arenas. Below are the consequences of two possible policies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Policy A</th>
<th>Policy B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged</td>
<td>Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly</td>
<td>Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Israel’s economy will be severely harmed</td>
<td>Israel’s economy will grow significantly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>The security, education, and health budgets will remain in their present form</td>
<td>The security budget will decrease, and the education and health budgets will increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Israeli government turns to the public to decide between these two policies in a plebiscite. Based on the information presented in the table above, which policy would you support?

1. Policy A
2. Policy B

Table 2: Values for Policy Outcomes in Conjoint Experiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Territory (T) | 1. Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged.  
                     2. Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank. |
| Security (S)  | 1. Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged.  
                     2. Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly.  
                     3. Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly. |
| Economy (E) | 1. The economy will remain unchanged.  
                     2. Israel’s economy will be severely harmed.  
                     3. Israel’s economy will grow significantly. |
| Budget (B)   | 1. The security, education, and health budgets will remain unchanged.  
                     2. The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease.  
                     3. The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase. |
Results

Figure 5 shows results for the full sample, plotting the AMCEs along with 95% confidence intervals (see SI, Section 2.2, for tabular results of all figures). The point estimate on each attribute represents its average effect on the probability that participants choose a policy containing this attribute over a policy with the baseline attribute. Points without confidence intervals denote baseline attributes. As Figure 5 shows, a policy that includes withdrawal from territory is 34.8 percentage points less likely to be chosen. The territorial attribute has the largest effect by far on policy choice, more than one and a half times the effect of the next most salient attribute, security. A policy leading to an increase in rocket attacks is 18.6 percentage points less likely to be selected, and a policy that reduces terrorist violence increases the probability of policy choice by 19.2 percentage points. In the economic domain, economic harm decreases the likelihood of a policy being chosen by 12.1 percentage points, while in the budget domain, a policy leading to an increase in allocation to security at the expense of health and education is 6.7 percentage points less likely to be chosen.

These results confirm that, in the aggregate, maintaining territorial control over the West Bank is a more important factor in determining the policy choice of Israeli constituents than security, the state of the economy, and social welfare. Moreover, it provides a compelling explanation for the counterintuitive policy preferences reported above, demonstrating that respondents prioritize territorial control over a range of strategic and material benefits.

Since our policy experiment established that territorial attachment is conditioned on political ideology, we present the conjoint results disaggregated by the three key political blocs in Israel.13 Consistent with our earlier results, Figure 6 reveals that whereas territorial control is secondary to security considerations among center and left-leaning respondents, it plays a crucial role in the policy considerations of right-wing voters.

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13 We code respondents as “left” if they identified as 1-3 on the seven-point ideology scale described above; “right” if they identified as 5-7; and center is they identified as 4.
Figure 5: Effects of Policy Attributes on Probability of Policy Choice

Note: The figure plots AMCEs of randomly assigned policy attributes on the probability of a policy being chosen by survey participants. Estimates are based on the OLS regression model reported in equation [1] with standard errors clustered by respondent. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Points without horizontal bars represent baseline attribute values.
Figure 6: Effects of Policy Attributes on Probability of Policy Choice by Ideology

*Note:* The figure plots AMCEs of randomly assigned policy attributes on the probability of a policy being chosen by survey participants, broken down by ideological self-placement. Estimates are based on the OLS regression model reported in equation [1] with standard errors clustered by respondent. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Points without horizontal bars represent baseline attribute values.
Though these findings demonstrate that territorial control takes precedence over economic and security considerations, it nevertheless remains unclear whether they are evidence of intangible stakes or whether they reflect a basic commitment problem, born out of fear concentrated mostly among right-wing voters that Palestinians might exploit concessions to impose greater costs. Put differently, if these voters could be assured of an agreement’s credibility, they would support territorial concessions. To assess whether voters value land for tangible or intangible reasons, we estimate (a) the proportion that would be willing to support territorial concessions when their security and livelihood would not be harmed; and (b) the proportion that would prefer maintaining control over the West Bank, even when it entails significant material and security costs. We do so by calculating predicted values of respondents’ policy choice from the conjoint experiment, while holding the four policy attributes at specific values. We report the results in Figure 7, focusing on the results for right-wing voters, reported in the top panel.

In support of the rationalist view, we find that about 45% of right-wing voters are willing to support a policy that results in territorial compromise (“give land”) if the policy is expected to reduce terror and rocket attacks, improve the economy and allocate greater resources towards social services (“all else good”). This group of right-wing constituents is highly attached to territory but for tangible reasons. If benefits of concessions are high and guaranteed, they would be willing to support withdrawal from the West Bank, which implies that, for them, a bargaining space exists. On the other hand, we find that over 50 percent of right-wing voters explicitly prefer retaining control over the West Bank even when terrorist violence increases substantially, the economy is severely harmed, and the budget allocation to health and education is reduced (“all else bad”). This group, representing about a third of all respondents, can be said to hold intangible territorial attachment. For them, no bargaining space effectively exists, rendering the territory indivisible in practice.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{14}By randomizing attributes of an object, conjoint experiments intend to manipulate beliefs about a specific attributes and only those beliefs. In any conjoint experiment, however, subjects may nonetheless consider prior beliefs not explicitly stated in the conjoint when selecting among alternatives. For example, respondents may continue to implicitly consider other material attributes when choosing policies that maintain control over the West Bank. Still, we believe that the fact that more than 50% of right-wing respondents would reject policies that entail territorial compromise even when “all is bad” suggests that this possible confounding is unlikely to be driving the conjoint results.
Figure 7: Preferences for Maintaining Territorial Control (By Ideology)

Note: The figure plots predicted values, by ideology, of policy choice while holding the attributes reported in Table 2 at specific values. For “Keep land (all else good),” we set the Territory indicator to “Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged”; the Security indicator to “Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly”; The Economy indicator to “Israel’s economy will grow significantly”; and the Budget indicator to “The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase.” For “Give land (all else good)” we changed the Territory indicator to “Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank.” For “Keep land (all else bad)” we set the territory indicator to territorial withdrawal and the other indicators to “Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly”, “Israel’s economy will be severely harmed,” and “The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease.”
Robustness of Conjoint Results

To ascertain that the results of our conjoint experiment are not simply artifacts of its particular design features, we designed an additional set of questions regarding the levels of economic and security-related risk that respondents were willing to assume in order to support territorial compromise. If individuals reject compromise even when there is no risk involved and the guarantee of benefits is completely credible, risk aversion and fear of rival defection cannot be the driver of policy positions. Our “credibility test” consists of two related questions. The first of these questions posed the following scenario to respondents:

“Imagine that the Israeli government is considering a number of far-reaching gestures to strengthen the Palestinian Authority (PA). These measures have an advantage and a disadvantage: On the one hand, they could lead to a substantial reduction in terrorism, of about 100 attacks a year, due to improved security cooperation with the Palestinians. On the other hand, should the gestures fail, they could strengthen Hamas and increase terrorism by about 30 attacks a year.”

Respondents were then asked to state when they would support the political gestures based solely on the information given in the question. Response categories ranged from “I will support the gestures in any case” through “I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 5%,” and continued in intervals of 10% until they reached “I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is 100%” and finally “I will not support the gestures under any circumstances.” Notably, this question did not explicitly reference territorial withdrawal but a “series of political gestures,” which in Israel implies increased PA control in the West Bank.

Our second question followed a similar format but highlighted material rather than security considerations:

“Currently, Israel earns approximately a billion dollars a year from international trade. Recently, the U.N. Security Council has begun to discuss international sanctions against Israel due to continued military rule in the Territories. A team of senior experts estimated that if the sanctions are approved, the Israeli economy will lose approximately 300 million dollars a year. The Israeli government can avoid sanctions only if it ends the current political situation by an agreement with the Palestinians. Given the risk of sanctions, at what point would you support such an agreement?”

Again, response categories ranged from “I will support such an agreement in any case” through “I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 5%,” and continued
in intervals of 10% until they reached “I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is 100%” and finally “I will not support the agreement under any circumstances.” We first compare the sensitivity of right-wing and left-wing voters to material costs and benefits of policies by plotting the demand curves of territorial concessions. Figure 8 plots the demand curve of concessions for different levels of security risk. The left panel presents results for those who self-identify as left on the political ideology scale. The graph is relatively elastic and generally linear, showing that, for every 10% decrease in the risks of terrorism, there is approximately the same increase in the proportion of people supporting concessions. A majority supports concession when risks are lower than 50%. In contrast, the right panel shows that those identifying as right-wing have fairly inelastic demand curves: the proportion supporting concessions doesn’t begin to rise above 10% until the risks of terrorism are lower than 60%. A majority would support concessions only if they were costless or nearly so.

The pattern is similar when we examine the sensitivity of voters to economic costs and benefits of concessions. Here, the benefits of concessions are avoiding sanctions, such that as the likelihood of sanctions rises, concessions become less costly. The costs of concessions can thus be thought of as the likelihood of avoiding sanctions. As shown in the left panel of Figure 9, the graph for left-wing voters remains fairly linear, though it is far less elastic, indicating that left-wing voters are much more sensitive to security costs than to economic costs in their support for concessions: a majority supports concessions even when the risk of sanctions is low. As for the right-wing, once again the pattern is fairly similar, though here, too, we see less sensitivity to economic costs: a slightly greater share of right-wingers would support concessions to reduce terrorism than to avoid sanctions.
Figure 8: Support for Concessions by Security Costs among Right-Wing and Left-Wing Voters

Note: The figure plots on the Y axis the cost of concessions in terms of percent success in reducing the level of terrorism; the cost increases as the chances of reducing terrorism decrease. The X axis plots the cumulative proportion of respondents in each bloc (left, right) who are willing to support concessions at different costs.
Figure 9: Support for Concessions by Sanction Costs among Right-Wing and Left-Wing Voters

Note: The figure plots on the Y axis the risk of economic sanctions; the lower the risk, the faster respondents are willing to give away territory, which constitutes a higher cost. Thus the cost of giving away territory increases as the chances of sanctions are lower. The X axis plots the cumulative proportion of respondents in each bloc (left, right) who are willing to support concessions at different costs.
While these findings show that the right is much less sensitive to material costs than the right, they do not allow us to disentangle those with tangible and intangible attachment within the right-wing bloc. To do so, we examine the responses of the right-wing separately. The top panel of Figure 10 demonstrates the diversity among those identifying as right-wing: About a half would support concessions if the likelihood of success in reducing terrorism is greater than fifty percent. This is consistent with results from our conjoint experiment, which indicate that around 45% of right-wing voters would concede territory if all other material outcomes were positive. On the other hand, a plurality of right-wing voters (about 40%) would never support concessions, regardless of the level of credibility. As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 10, when economic issues are at stake, around 38% of respondents would refuse to end the military occupation even with the certainty of severe economic sanctions. Again, however, Figure 10 (bottom panel) suggests that right-wing voters are divided on this issue. These results replicate and confirm the findings of our conjoint experiment, indicating that a large minority (around 30-40%) of our sample is insensitive to important costs and benefits in the security and economic domains when territorial control is at stake.

Results from these credibility questions increase our confidence in the results of the conjoint analysis. Though each is subject to certain limitations, the cumulative evidence indicates that a large share of Israeli respondents is willing to escalate conflict in order to retain territorial control, thereby substantially reducing the bargaining space of leaders. At the same time, the evidence calls for caution in attributing territorial attachment to all individuals based on biological, ethnic, or historical factors. Rather, there is important diversity even among those who exhibit strong attachment to the land. This diversity, we argue, has important implications for the likelihood of bargaining over territory during territorial conflicts. In the next section we explore this argument further.

\[15\] See Table 6 and Figure 9 in SI, for results for the entire sample.
Figure 10: Support for Concessions and Risk Taking among Right-Wing Voters

Note: The figure plots the distribution of responses for level of risk survey participants are willing to take when supporting potentially beneficial Israeli concessions.
Why Territorial Preferences Matter: From Public Opinion To Policy Making

How does intangible public attachment to land shape leaders’ bargaining space? Existing theoretical accounts argue that by mobilizing public support around territorial issues, elites become locked into hardline positions that effectively narrow their bargaining range, limiting their ability to negotiate. Since the stakes are framed as intangible, any concessions will be too politically costly for elites to attempt. Our data do not allow us to test this proposition directly, as they focus on the public rather than elites. Nonetheless, we are able to shed light on the political effects of domestic territorial attachment by examining how the distribution of attachment to land among respondents relates to their vote choice in national elections.

We consider two alternative accounts: first, that ideological voters, insensitive to material costs, are primarily concentrated among the constituents of Israel’s most far right parties. Here, leaders are constrained by coalitional politics. If the Prime Minister forms a coalition with these parties (as Netanyahu has done, in the most recent elections), he becomes constrained by his coalition partners, polarizing his positions and rendering the disputed territory effectively indivisible. He nevertheless, in theory, has the option of forming a coalition with parties at the center-left, thereby opening a bargaining space for a possible resolution of the conflict. Alternatively, it may be that ideological voters are not concentrated at the far right but are distributed across the right-wing spectrum. If this is the case, a prime minister from the right is constrained not by his coalitional partners but by his own base, the core voters of his party.

To investigate this question we rerun the conjoint analysis on the subset of right-wing voters. In this iteration of the model we add an interaction between the four treatment variables (i.e., the four randomized policy attributes) and a covariate capturing past vote choice. We dichotomize the variable such that voters for the more centrist Likud party form one category, and voters for more right-wing parties form the second category. We then calculate the predicted probability that respondents with these covariates hold “effectively indivisible” policy positions; i.e., that they select the generic policy that maintains territorial control even when all other outcomes (terror and rocket attacks, the economy and budget allocation to social services) “are bad.”

16 Past vote choice is measured using respondents’ response to whom they voted for in the 2013 general elections.
17 These include voters for Bayit Yehudi, Yahadut Hatorah, and Otzma Leyisrael, see SI for details on coding.
The right panel of Figure 11 shows that as expected, a large majority of voters for far right parties (around 70%) would prefer to keep the land even if security, the economy, and social welfare were reduced. However, the left-hand panel shows that such ideological voters are common among Likud voters as well: nearly half would prefer maintaining territorial control when all other outcomes were bad. This finding indicates that a right-wing leader such as Netanyahu must contend not only with his coalitional partners but with his own political base, severely constraining his bargaining space and making negotiations highly difficult from a public opinion perspective.

Figure 11: Preferences for Maintaining Territorial Control (Right-Wing Bloc)

Note: The figure plots the predicted values of policy choice, divided between Likud supporters (left panel) and farther right-wing parties (right panel), while holding the policy attributes reported in Table 2 at specific values. See Figure 7 for details on the category definitions. The dots indicate point estimates, and the horizontal bars 95% confidence intervals.

As a final illustration of how public attachment to territory affects the bargaining space of leaders, we once again use data on respondent vote choice to examine the demand curve for concessions among two potential government coalitions: A narrow right-wing government (operationalized as the Likud and all parties to its right), and a moderate right government (that excludes Ultra-Orthodox parties and includes centrist parties.) Here, we use data from our “credibility test”, which asked respondents for the level of risk they would agree to accept in agreeing to potentially beneficial territorial compromise. Figure 12 plots the demand curve for concessions by terrorism risk for each coalition, as measured by voters for the parties included in the coalition. It shows that, unsurprisingly, the curve for a narrow right-wing government is highly inelastic, with a majority opposing concessions nearly regardless of the level of costs. A center-right government is similarly constrained, however, as a majority of its constituents would agree to concessions only when they involved a risk of

18See SI for full coding details.
less than 20%. In understanding “effective indivisibility” as demand inelasticity, this figure provides a graphic illustration of what a narrow bargaining space means in practice.

Figure 12: Bargaining Space by Government Coalition

![Graphs showing the relationship between risk of terrorism and proportion supporting concessions for different government coalitions.](image)

Note: The figure plots on the Y axis the cost of concessions in terms of percent success in reducing the level of terrorism; the cost increases as the chances of reducing terrorism decrease. The X axis plots the cumulative proportion of respondents in each coalition (right-center, narrow right) who are willing to support concessions at different costs.

Conclusion

The long-observed link between territorial disputes and conflict onset, escalation, duration, and termination has been attributed, on the one hand, to the tangible value of territory combined with the credibility problem, and on the other hand to intangible value. We have argued that tangible and intangible are better thought of as characteristics of preferences rather than of land, since territories often possess both material and symbolic worth. In addition, we proposed a set of methodological tools that can be used in diverse empirical contexts to disentangle tangible preferences from intangible ones, and to understand the implications of the nature of public attachment for the likelihood of conflict resolution.

Our empirical analysis reveals that in the Israeli case, a significant minority (40-45%) of our sample, identifying as center or left, does not appear to be particularly attached to the disputed territory, prioritizing other issues such as security and economic well-being. Among
right-wing voters, who view territory as highly salient, there is an important variation as well: while over 50% of right-wing voters (approximately one third of our sample) are willing to bear substantial material costs to retain territorial control, other right-wing voters reject concessions due to concerns about the rival’s credibility and likelihood of defection.

By systematically studying the heterogeneity of preferences within one case, we are able to identify patterns that may explain the persistence and recurrence of territorial conflicts on the domestic level. When the distribution of public preferences around territory favors certain political parties, there is a reduced likelihood of territorial bargaining, even in cases where many individuals within a country are still open to negotiations. Our results therefore show that for “effective indivisibly” to take place, there is no need for a majority to hold intangible territorial attachment. Instead, we argue, the distribution of public preferences should favor political parties that are able to constrain political leaders’ bargaining space. As such, our study contributes to the large literature on territorial conflict by revealing how heterogeneity in territorial preferences shapes domestic political processes, which in turn lead to greater political intransigence.

In addition, our study provides a better understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a territorial conflict that has long consumed the interest of policy makers. The literature on that conflict has been divided on the sources of attachment to territory: while some scholars have argued that, with the exception of an ideological minority, the majority of Israeli society views the control of the West Bank in instrumental terms as a strategic and material asset (Newman, Rynhold and Waxman, 2008), others have argued that Israeli attachment to the West Bank is ideological and symbolic (Lustick, 1993; Ginges et al., 2007). Our findings provide evidence that adjudicates among these claims, pointing to the limitations of a policy approach that focuses solely on increasing the material benefits of peace.

Our analysis suggests a number of avenues for future research. First, our findings regarding voter heterogeneity raise the question of who values territory and why. We investigate this question directly in a separate study. Second, as public opinion is not static but rather is subject to changes over time, an important question is whether and how attitudes towards territory can shift. Potential factors include, for example, elite cues and framing efforts (Zellman, 2015) and exogenous shocks. If, for example, the costs of territorial control were to rise significantly (due to such factors as increased violence or external pressure), then policy preferences among those who hold more rationalist views would likely change. Similar research, conducted at different points in time, could shed further light on this question. Finally, that our study finds evidence for preference heterogeneity suggests that territorial preferences may vary across contexts. Indeed, we believe that such heterogeneity underpins
the importance of in-depth analysis of specific cases. Future research could replicate this paper’s procedure in different conflict areas, such as the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir or Eastern Ukraine.

In addition to the contribution to the theoretical debate on conflict and territory, our findings have important policy implications for the promotion of peaceful conflict resolution. First, they suggest that framing a peace agreement solely in instrumental terms—by highlighting security and material benefits—is unlikely to win over a substantial share of the Israeli population. At least in this context, peace-building efforts should take ideological dimensions seriously, in the discourse they employ and in the stakeholders they involve (see also [Ginges et al., 2007]). Additionally, our findings point to the important role of leadership in advocating non-violent means to resolve conflict. When public opinion attaches strong value to control over territory, leaders will need substantial individual and political clout to promote negotiations in the face of widespread public opposition.
### Appendix

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics: First Wave Sample

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References


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