

Supplementary Information

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Introduction

This appendix reports in detail our data collection method and coding procedures and presents additional empirical analyses. Section 1 provides additional information on the three survey waves used for estimating the results reported in the main text, including issues related to recruitment, response rates, and representativeness. Section 2 presents selected results reported in the main text in tabular form, and provides additional estimations for the conjoint experiment, including balance tests and interaction effects of different policy attributes. Section 3 lists the survey questions used in the analysis reported in the main text, as well as the coding of key variables. Section 4 describes in detail the design and results from the second wave of the survey, while section 5 presents our first wave design and results.

1 Survey of the Israeli Public

This section provides additional information on the three survey waves reported in the main text. The surveys were designed to examine public opinion towards territorial policies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and evaluate the relative importance that the public assigns to symbolic and material dimensions of these policies.

1.1 Three Survey Waves

Our study draws on three survey waves administered on Israeli Jewish voters in three distinct time periods. The first wave was fielded in April 2014, during a relatively peaceful period of negotiations led by United States Secretary of State John Kerry. As we describe in our pre-analysis plan on the Experiments in Governance and Politics (EGAPs) Design Registration webpage, the original goal of the first survey was to assess the reaction of Israelis to various policy primes by randomly assigning respondents to descriptions of conciliatory and coercive policies in the conflict. The analysis of the first wave pointed to a puzzling result: that Israelis prefer coercive policies over conciliatory ones, even as they acknowledge that conciliatory measures are more effective. To examine possible explanations for this counterintuitive finding, we designed the second survey wave.

The second survey was conducted in January 2015, a few months after the 2014 conflict in Gaza. The second wave was designed to, first, replicate the first wave’s puzzling results and rule out the possibility that voter irrationality or a ‘fluke’ sample explain the findings. Second, we sought to evaluate whether symbolic attachment to territory explains public support for policies by designing a conjoint experiment and credibility exercise. The conjoint experiment sought to disentangle the symbolic dimensions of territory from its strategic and material ones, while the credibility exercise was designed to measure the level of risk respondents were willing to assume in agreeing to territorial compromise, thereby getting at the question of whether respondents who opposed negotiations did so for symbolic reasons or due to worries over rival credibility.

The conjoint experiment asked respondents to choose between two policies under consideration by the Israeli government. For each policy, we randomly varied four attributes across pairings: the policy’s effects on security, on the economy, on budget allocation to key social services, and on control over territory. One of the key assumptions underlying our experiment is that policy attributes are orthogonal to each other, as well as to respondents’ characteristics. This random assignment enables identifying the causal effect of each attribute on the probability of policy support, and allows us to disentangle policy attributes that are naturally correlated, such as security and territorial control.

Our third survey was conducted in August 2017, in a relatively stable period punctuated by bouts of local escalation, particularly in Jerusalem. The third wave, reported in the main paper, was designed to replicate our previous results and to further refine our measures in two ways: First, we explicitly addressed attitudes towards East Jerusalem rather than focus solely on the West Bank.¹ Second, we added a “valuation exercise,” designed to test whether our prior results were artifacts of the specific costs laid out in our conjoint experiment. In other words, the exercise was designed to rule out the possibility that respondents *do* place a tangible value on the territory, but that value is higher than the value we stipulated in our conjoint (e.g. higher than “severe harm to the economy”).

¹ In the conjoint experiment, we restricted attribute levels to exclude random combinations that were so unrealistic as to be non-credible to respondents. These included: 1) a significant decrease in rocket and terrorist attacks together with significant harm to the Israeli economy, 2) a significant decrease in rocket and terrorist attacks together with an increase in the security budget and decrease in the health and education budgets, 3) a significant increase in rocket and terrorist attacks together with significant growth to the Israeli economy, and 4) a significant increase in rocket and terrorist attacks together with a decrease in the security budget and increase in the health and education budgets.

1.2 Recruitment into the Study

The surveys were administered by iPanel, Israel’s largest opt-in Internet survey firm, and the only Israeli Internet survey firm to have received a certificate of approval from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem’s Department of Statistics, stating that with appropriate weighting its panel can be used as a sampling frame for the Israeli Jewish population.

We calculate participation rates following the recommendation of Baker et al. (2010), who define rates of participation as “the number of respondents who have provided a usable response divided by the total number of initial personal invitations requesting participation” (p. 50). In the first wave, the survey company invited 13,226 individuals to participate, stratified by gender, age, religiosity, and area of residence. Among those, 2,697 began the survey (20.4 percent), and among those who responded, 1,963 completed the first wave (72.8 percent). In the second wave, 11,000 invitations were sent, stratified by gender, age, education, and area of residence. Among those, 2,422 began the survey (22 percent), and among those who responded, 1,217 completed the survey (50.2 percent). We did not screen out any individuals who completed the survey. In the third wave, 2,739 began the survey and 1,345 completed the survey (49 percent).

1.3 Descriptive Statistics: Three waves

1.4 Sample Representativeness

The use of an online survey may raise concerns about the representativeness of our sample with respect to the target population. In order to test representativeness, we compare key demographic characteristics of our study participants with demographic data on the general Jewish Israeli population. We make use of the 2013 Israel Social Survey (ISS), a nationally representative study of the Israeli population administered by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics ($N = 5,844$)² among Israelis aged 20 and older.³

Figures 20 through 25 plot the distributions of age, gender, income, education, religiosity, and area of residence in the two samples. It can be seen that in terms of these key variables our sample is representative. While the distributions are not identical, they present similar patterns. In addition, we conducted Chi-squared tests to evaluate the extent to which the two samples can be considered as coming from the same population. For all six variables, we were not able to reject the null hypothesis that the type of sample (i.e., our study or the ISS survey) is independent of the distributions of these variables.

²The number of observations excludes non-Jewish participants.

³The data were made available by the Israel Social Science Data Center (ISDC) at the Hebrew University.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: First Wave Sample

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Demographic variables					
Age	40.58	14.50	18	70	1963
Female	0.51	0.50	0	1	1963
Income					
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.14	0.35	0	1	1962
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.29	0.46	0	1	1963
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.17	0.37	0	1	1962
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.32	0.47	0	1	1963
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.07	0.26	0	1	1963
Education					
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.00	0.06	0	1	1963
<i>High school</i>	0.19	0.39	0	1	1962
<i>Vocational</i>	0.17	0.38	0	1	1962
<i>Academic</i>	0.62	0.49	0	1	1963
Area of residence					
<i>West Bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.11	0.32	0	1	1963
<i>Outside West bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.89	0.32	0	1	1963
Religiosity					
<i>Secular</i>	0.52	0.50	0	1	1963
<i>Traditional</i>	0.31	0.46	0	1	1963
<i>Religious</i>	0.14	0.35	0	1	1963
<i>Haredi</i>	0.03	0.17	0	1	1963
Ethnicity					
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.33	0.47	0	1	1963
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.46	0.50	0	1	1963
Political ideology					
Right-left self placement	3.44	1.44	1	7	1963
Voting in 2013					
<i>Voted for right-wing parties</i>	0.43	0.49	0	1	1795
<i>Voted for centrist parties</i>	0.35	0.48	0	1	1795
<i>Voted for left-wing parties</i>	0.23	0.42	0	1	1795

Figure 1: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Age




Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Second Wave Sample

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Demographic variables					
Age	41.01	14.29	18	70	1217
Female	0.54	0.50	0	1	1217
Income					
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.26	0.44	0	1	1217
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.19	0.39	0	1	1217
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.20	0.40	0	1	1217
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.18	0.38	0	1	1217
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.10	0.29	0	1	1217
Education					
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.26	0.44	0	1	1217
<i>High school</i>	0.22	0.42	0	1	1217
<i>Vocational</i>	0.22	0.42	0	1	1217
<i>Academic</i>	0.30	0.46	0	1	1217
Area of residence					
<i>West Bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.14	0.34	0	1	1217
<i>Outside the West bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.86	0.34	0	1	1217
Religiosity					
<i>Secular</i>	0.55	0.50	0	1	1217
<i>Traditional</i>	0.21	0.41	0	1	1217
<i>Religious</i>	0.13	0.34	0	1	1217
<i>Haredi</i>	0.10	0.30	0	1	1217
Ethnicity					
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.34	0.47	0	1	1217
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.44	0.50	0	1	1217
Political ideology					
Right-left self placement	3.25	1.62	1	7	1217
Voting in 2013					
<i>Voted for right-wing parties</i>	0.51	0.50	0	1	1098
<i>Voted for centrist parties</i>	0.32	0.47	0	1	1098
<i>Voted for left-wing parties</i>	0.17	0.38	0	1	1098

Figure 2: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Gender




Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Third Wave Sample

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
<i>Demographic variables</i>					
Age					
<i>18-29</i>	0.26	0.44	0	1	1342
<i>30-39</i>	0.21	0.41	0	1	1342
<i>40-49</i>	0.19	0.39	0	1	1342
<i>50-59</i>	0.17	0.38	0	1	1342
<i>60+</i>	0.16	0.37	0	1	1342
Female	0.52	0.50	0	1	1339
Income					
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.20	0.40	0	1	1222
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.20	0.40	0	1	1222
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.24	0.43	0	1	1222
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.25	0.43	0	1	1222
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.10	0.31	0	1	1222
Education					
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.08	0.28	0	1	1232
<i>High school</i>	0.19	0.39	0	1	1232
<i>Vocational</i>	0.22	0.41	0	1	1232
<i>Academic</i>	0.51	0.50	0	1	1232
Area of residence					
<i>Resident in West Bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.15	0.36	0	1	1345
<i>Resides outside the West bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.85	0.36	0	1	1345
Religiosity					
<i>Secular</i>	0.49	0.50	0	1	1345
<i>Traditional</i>	0.31	0.46	0	1	1345
<i>Religious</i>	0.13	0.34	0	1	1345
<i>Haredi</i>	0.07	0.25	0	1	1345
Ethnicity					
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.33	0.47	0	1	1222
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.42	0.49	0	1	1222
<i>Political ideology</i>					
Voting in 2015					
<i>Voted for right-wing parties</i>	0.34	0.48	0	1	1345
<i>Voted for centrist parties</i>	0.25	0.43	0	1	1345
<i>Voted for left-wing parties</i>	0.21	0.41	0	1	1345

Figure 3: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Income




Figure 4: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Education




Figure 5: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Religiosity





Figure 6: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Area of Residence



2 Additional Estimations

2.1 Balance Tests for Conjoint Experiment

Tables 4 through 7 report balance tests for each attribute in the conjoint experiment. Since randomization in the conjoint includes a very large number of permutations, we report, for each set of attributes in a given domain, the means and standard deviations of the attributes in other domains, as well as of key demographic characteristics. Table 4 reports balance tests for the territory attribute levels. The top panel reports means and standard deviations of levels in other attributes. The bottom panel reports balance tests for demographic variables. It can be seen that across all conjoint attributes and demographic characteristics, the experiment successfully achieved randomization. Tables 5, 6 and 7 report balance tests for the security, economy, and budget attributes, respectively. It can be seen that also in these attributes our experiment was successfully randomized.

Table 4: Balance Table: Conjoint Territory Attributes

	Mean (Territory: no change)	Std. Dev. (Territory: no change)	Mean (Territory: withdraw no Jslm)	Std. Dev. (Territory: withdraw no Jslm)	Diff.	Pval	Mean (Territory: withdraw Jslm)	Std. Dev. (Territory: withdraw Jslm)	Diff.	Pval
Other conjoint domains										
Security	2.14	0.86	2.17	0.87	-0.03	0.46	2.12	0.87	0.02	0.65
Economy	1.99	0.85	2.00	0.84	-0.01	0.78	2.00	0.86	-0.01	0.80
Budgets	2.12	0.85	2.08	0.85	0.04	0.33	2.09	0.85	0.04	0.37
Demographic characteristics										
Female	0.51	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.00	0.93	0.53	0.50	-0.02	0.46
Income										
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.19	0.39	0.19	0.39	0.00	0.89	0.17	0.38	0.02	0.34
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.16	0.37	0.20	0.40	-0.03	0.06	0.19	0.39	-0.02	0.18
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.21	0.41	0.22	0.41	-0.00	0.86	0.23	0.42	-0.01	0.45
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.23	0.42	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.90	0.23	0.42	0.01	0.71
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.10	0.30	0.09	0.28	0.01	0.33	0.09	0.29	0.01	0.46
Education										
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.10	0.30	0.06	0.24	0.04	0.00	0.07	0.25	0.03	0.03
<i>High school</i>	0.17	0.38	0.16	0.37	0.01	0.71	0.20	0.40	-0.03	0.17
<i>Vocational</i>	0.19	0.39	0.20	0.40	-0.01	0.65	0.21	0.41	-0.02	0.36
<i>Academic</i>	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.50	-0.06	0.02	0.44	0.50	0.02	0.49
Area of residence										
<i>West Bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.15	0.36	0.14	0.35	0.01	0.53	0.15	0.36	0.00	0.98
<i>Outside the West bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.85	0.36	0.86	0.35	-0.01	0.53	0.85	0.36	-0.00	0.98
Religiosity										
<i>Secular</i>	0.48	0.50	0.49	0.50	-0.01	0.61	0.49	0.50	-0.01	0.83
<i>Traditional</i>	0.33	0.47	0.30	0.46	0.03	0.14	0.32	0.47	0.01	0.58
<i>Religious</i>	0.12	0.33	0.14	0.34	-0.01	0.48	0.13	0.34	-0.01	0.54
<i>Haredi</i>	0.07	0.25	0.07	0.26	-0.01	0.44	0.06	0.24	0.00	0.83
Ethnicity										
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.31	0.46	0.29	0.45	0.02	0.26	0.30	0.46	0.02	0.47
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.35	0.48	0.41	0.49	-0.06	0.01	0.37	0.48	-0.02	0.33

Table 5: Balance Table: Conjoint Security Attributes

	Mean (Security: no change)	Std. Dev. (Security: no change)	Mean (Security: less terrorism)	Std. Dev. (Security: less terrorism)	Diff.	Pval	Mean (Security: more terrorism)	Std. Dev. (Security: more terrorism)	Diff.	Pval
Other conjoint domains										
Territory	2.00	0.81	2.02	0.82	-0.02	0.62	1.99	0.82	0.01	0.82
Economy	2.02	0.80	1.98	0.80	0.04	0.30	1.97	1.00	0.05	0.26
Budgets	1.99	0.82	1.98	1.00	0.01	0.78	2.48	0.50	-0.49	0.00
Demographic characteristics										
Female	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.50	-0.01	0.57	0.54	0.50	-0.03	0.26
Income										
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.18	0.38	0.18	0.39	-0.00	0.83	0.19	0.39	-0.01	0.54
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.18	0.39	0.18	0.38	0.01	0.58	0.18	0.38	0.00	0.81
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.22	0.42	0.22	0.42	-0.00	0.99	0.21	0.41	0.02	0.46
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.23	0.42	0.22	0.41	0.01	0.58	0.25	0.43	-0.02	0.41
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.09	0.28	0.11	0.31	-0.02	0.07	0.09	0.28	-0.00	0.88
Education										
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.09	0.28	0.06	0.24	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.25	0.02	0.12
<i>High school</i>	0.17	0.38	0.18	0.39	-0.01	0.59	0.17	0.38	0.00	0.82
<i>Vocational</i>	0.20	0.40	0.19	0.39	0.02	0.37	0.20	0.40	0.01	0.77
<i>Academic</i>	0.45	0.50	0.48	0.50	-0.04	0.09	0.48	0.50	-0.04	0.13
Area of residence										
<i>West Bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.15	0.36	0.15	0.36	0.00	0.97	0.15	0.36	0.00	0.93
<i>Outside the West bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.85	0.36	0.85	0.36	-0.00	0.97	0.85	0.36	-0.00	0.93
Religiosity										
<i>Secular</i>	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.01	0.56	0.46	0.50	0.04	0.14
<i>Traditional</i>	0.30	0.46	0.31	0.46	-0.00	0.91	0.34	0.47	-0.04	0.12
<i>Religious</i>	0.13	0.33	0.14	0.34	-0.01	0.47	0.13	0.34	-0.00	0.84
<i>Hardi</i>	0.07	0.25	0.07	0.25	0.00	0.98	0.07	0.25	0.00	0.77
Ethnicity										
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.30	0.46	0.28	0.45	0.02	0.32	0.30	0.46	0.00	0.83
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.37	0.48	0.39	0.49	-0.01	0.54	0.38	0.49	-0.01	0.66

Table 6: Balance Table: Conjoint Economy Attributes

	Mean (Economy: no change)	Std. Dev. (Economy: no change)	Mean (Economy: harmed)	Std. Dev. (Economy: harmed)	Diff.	Pval	Mean (Economy: grow)	Std. Dev. (Economy: grow)	Diff.	Pval
<i>Other conjoint domains</i>										
Territory	2.01	0.82	2.00	0.82	0.01	0.80	2.00	0.80	0.01	0.80
Security	2.15	0.82	2.10	0.82	0.04	0.26	2.20	0.98	-0.05	0.27
Budgets	2.14	0.83	2.14	0.83	0.00	0.97	1.99	0.89	0.15	0.00
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>										
Female	0.53	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.00	0.90	0.50	0.50	0.02	0.31
Income										
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.18	0.38	0.19	0.39	-0.01	0.68	0.18	0.39	-0.00	0.79
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.18	0.38	0.18	0.39	-0.01	0.72	0.18	0.38	0.00	0.97
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.22	0.41	0.24	0.43	-0.02	0.22	0.20	0.40	0.02	0.43
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.23	0.42	0.22	0.41	0.01	0.61	0.24	0.43	-0.01	0.63
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.09	0.29	0.08	0.28	0.01	0.43	0.11	0.31	-0.01	0.37
Education										
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.07	0.26	0.07	0.26	-0.00	0.85	0.09	0.28	-0.02	0.23
<i>High school</i>	0.18	0.39	0.17	0.38	0.01	0.44	0.18	0.38	0.01	0.74
<i>Vocational</i>	0.18	0.38	0.22	0.42	-0.04	0.02	0.19	0.39	-0.01	0.50
<i>Academic</i>	0.48	0.50	0.46	0.50	0.01	0.52	0.46	0.50	0.01	0.54
Area of residence										
<i>West Bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.15	0.35	0.15	0.36	-0.00	0.78	0.15	0.36	-0.00	0.94
<i>Outside the West bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.85	0.35	0.85	0.36	0.00	0.78	0.85	0.36	0.00	0.94
Religiosity										
<i>Secular</i>	0.47	0.50	0.49	0.50	-0.02	0.35	0.50	0.50	-0.02	0.34
<i>Traditional</i>	0.32	0.47	0.30	0.46	0.02	0.39	0.32	0.47	-0.00	0.95
<i>Religious</i>	0.13	0.34	0.14	0.35	-0.01	0.67	0.11	0.32	0.02	0.22
<i>Haredi</i>	0.07	0.26	0.06	0.24	0.01	0.38	0.07	0.25	0.00	0.69
Ethnicity										
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.31	0.46	0.29	0.45	0.02	0.29	0.29	0.45	0.03	0.25
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.37	0.48	0.36	0.48	0.00	0.89	0.41	0.49	-0.05	0.06

Table 7: Balance Table: Conjoint Budget Attributes

	Mean (Budget: no change)	Std. Dev. (Budget: no change)	Mean (Budget: social services decrease)	Std. Dev. (Budget: social services decrease)	Diff.	Pval	Mean (Budget: social services increase)	Std. Dev. (Budget: social services increase)	Diff.	Pval
<i>Other conjoint domains</i>										
Territory	1.99	0.82	1.99	0.81	-0.00	1.00	2.02	0.81	-0.03	0.35
Security	2.00	0.86	2.57	0.50	-0.57	0.00	1.99	1.00	0.01	0.82
Economy	2.00	0.86	1.99	0.89	0.01	0.78	2.00	0.80	0.00	0.99
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>										
Female	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.50	-0.01	0.59	0.53	0.50	-0.02	0.41
Income										
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.19	0.39	0.19	0.39	-0.01	0.74	0.17	0.38	0.01	0.53
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.18	0.39	0.17	0.38	0.01	0.50	0.18	0.39	0.00	0.91
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.22	0.42	0.20	0.40	0.02	0.34	0.23	0.42	-0.01	0.54
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.22	0.41	0.25	0.43	-0.03	0.13	0.23	0.42	-0.02	0.43
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.10	0.30	0.08	0.28	0.02	0.26	0.09	0.29	0.01	0.68
Education										
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.06	0.24	0.08	0.28	-0.02	0.12	0.09	0.28	-0.02	0.07
<i>High school</i>	0.18	0.39	0.17	0.38	0.01	0.49	0.17	0.38	0.01	0.67
<i>Vocational</i>	0.20	0.40	0.19	0.39	0.02	0.43	0.20	0.40	0.00	0.90
<i>Academic</i>	0.47	0.50	0.47	0.50	-0.00	0.90	0.47	0.50	-0.00	0.97
Area of residence										
<i>West Bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.16	0.37	0.14	0.35	0.02	0.22	0.14	0.34	0.03	0.08
<i>Outside the West bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.84	0.37	0.86	0.35	-0.02	0.22	0.86	0.34	-0.03	0.08
Religiosity										
<i>Secular</i>	0.50	0.50	0.46	0.50	0.05	0.06	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.89
<i>Traditional</i>	0.28	0.45	0.34	0.47	-0.06	0.01	0.33	0.47	-0.04	0.03
<i>Religious</i>	0.14	0.35	0.13	0.34	0.02	0.36	0.11	0.32	0.03	0.05
<i>Haredi</i>	0.07	0.26	0.07	0.26	-0.00	0.82	0.06	0.23	0.01	0.27
Ethnicity										
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.28	0.45	0.31	0.46	-0.03	0.22	0.31	0.46	-0.04	0.08
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.39	0.49	0.38	0.49	0.01	0.78	0.37	0.48	0.02	0.38

2.2 Tabular Results and Additional Results Mentioned in the Main Paper

This section reports the results mentioned in the main text in tabular form, as well as additional estimations not presented in the main text.

Table 8: Conjoint Results: Policy Choice

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	Z-value	P-value
<i>All Respondents</i>					
budgets economy security territory	The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase	0.03	0.02	1.23	0.22
	The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease	-0.05	0.03	-1.54	0.12
	Israel's economy will be severely harmed	-0.10	0.02	-4.78	0.00 ***
	Israel's economy will grow significantly	0.06	0.02	2.57	0.01 *
	Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly	0.14	0.02	6.20	0.00 ***
	Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly	-0.12	0.04	-2.85	0.00 **
	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, but not from East Jerusalem	-0.06	0.02	-2.43	0.02 *
	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem	-0.19	0.02	-8.32	0.00 ***
	<i>Right</i>				
budgets economy security territory	The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase	0.00	0.04	0.09	0.92
	The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease	-0.03	0.06	-0.43	0.67
	Israel's economy will be severely harmed	-0.10	0.04	-2.87	0.00 **
	Israel's economy will grow significantly	0.07	0.04	1.61	0.11
	Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly	0.10	0.04	2.78	0.01 **
	Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly	-0.02	0.07	-0.23	0.82
	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, but not from East Jerusalem	-0.25	0.04	-6.55	0.00 ***
	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem	-0.36	0.03	-10.21	0.00 ***
	<i>Center</i>				
budgets economy security territory	The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase	0.02	0.05	0.41	0.68
	The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease	-0.05	0.07	-0.76	0.45
	Israel's economy will be severely harmed	-0.13	0.04	-3.09	0.00 **
	Israel's economy will grow significantly	0.03	0.05	0.70	0.48
	Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly	0.15	0.05	3.38	0.00 ***
	Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly	-0.06	0.08	-0.69	0.49
	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, but not from East Jerusalem	-0.03	0.05	-0.71	0.48
	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem	-0.19	0.05	-4.02	0.00 ***
	<i>Left</i>				
budgets economy security territory	The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase	0.12	0.05	2.39	0.02 *
	The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease	-0.03	0.06	-0.51	0.61
	Israel's economy will be severely harmed	-0.11	0.05	-2.32	0.02 *
	Israel's economy will grow significantly	0.08	0.05	1.56	0.12
	Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly	0.15	0.05	2.99	0.00 **
	Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly	-0.36	0.08	-4.72	0.00 ***
	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, but not from East Jerusalem	0.21	0.05	4.48	0.00 ***
	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem	0.11	0.05	2.32	0.02 *

Table 9: Conjoint Results: Policy Ranking

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	Z-value	P-value
<i>All Respondents</i>					
budgets	The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase	0.12	0.10	1.28	0.20
budgets	The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease	-0.19	0.13	-1.43	0.15
economy	Israel's economy will be severely harmed	-0.37	0.09	-4.30	***
economy	Israel's economy will grow significantly	0.25	0.10	2.44	*
security	Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly	0.60	0.10	6.14	***
security	Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly	-0.33	0.16	-2.05	*
territory	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, but not from East Jerusalem	-0.44	0.10	-4.60	***
territory	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem	-0.79	0.10	-8.12	***
<i>Right</i>					
budgets	The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase	-0.12	0.14	-0.80	0.42
budgets	The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease	-0.27	0.20	-1.35	0.18
economy	Israel's economy will be severely harmed	-0.26	0.13	-1.94	0.05
economy	Israel's economy will grow significantly	0.23	0.16	1.46	0.14
security	Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly	0.46	0.14	3.30	0.00
security	Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly	-0.23	0.23	-0.97	0.33
territory	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, but not from East Jerusalem	-1.51	0.14	-10.46	***
territory	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem	-1.95	0.15	-13.37	***
<i>Center</i>					
budgets	The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase	0.12	0.15	0.80	0.42
budgets	The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease	-0.31	0.23	-1.37	0.17
economy	Israel's economy will be severely harmed	-0.47	0.14	-3.38	0.00
economy	Israel's economy will grow significantly	0.14	0.16	0.85	0.40
security	Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly	0.83	0.15	5.50	0.00
security	Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly	-0.45	0.26	-1.69	0.09
territory	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, but not from East Jerusalem	-0.01	0.15	-0.07	0.94
territory	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem	-0.49	0.14	-3.41	0.00
<i>Left</i>					
budgets	The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase	0.64	0.18	3.62	0.00
budgets	The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease	0.20	0.26	0.78	0.43
economy	Israel's economy will be severely harmed	-0.44	0.15	-2.95	0.00
economy	Israel's economy will grow significantly	0.31	0.18	1.71	0.09
security	Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly	0.62	0.17	3.60	0.00
security	Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly	-0.32	0.31	-1.05	0.30
territory	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, but not from East Jerusalem	0.92	0.17	5.40	0.00
territory	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem	0.89	0.19	4.72	0.00

Table 10: Preferences for Maintaining Territorial Control in Tabular Form

	Estimate	95% Min	95% Max
<i>All</i>			
Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)	0.83	0.78	0.88
Give territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)	0.64	0.58	0.69
Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else bad)	0.29	0.24	0.35
<i>Right</i>			
Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)	0.87	0.79	0.95
Give territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)	0.51	0.42	0.59
Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else bad)	0.51	0.43	0.6
<i>Center</i>			
Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)	0.83	0.73	0.92
Give territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)	0.64	0.54	0.74
Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else bad)	0.23	0.13	0.33
<i>Left</i>			
Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)	0.74	0.63	0.85
Give territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)	0.84	0.75	0.94
Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else bad)	-0.03	-0.12	0.06
<i>Likud</i>			
Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)	0.86	0.76	0.96
Give territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)	0.52	0.4	0.65
Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else bad)	0.48	0.36	0.6
<i>Extreme right</i>			
Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)	0.88	0.76	1
Give territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)	0.49	0.36	0.61
Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else bad)	0.54	0.42	0.66

Table 11: Support for Concessions and Risk Taking in Tabular Form

	All	Right	Center	Left
<i>Terrorism risk</i>				
Always support	0.07	0.02	0.05	0.18
5%	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
10%	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02
20%	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.05
30%	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.08
40%	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.07
50%	0.09	0.06	0.14	0.11
60%	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.08
70%	0.09	0.06	0.12	0.12
80%	0.12	0.11	0.13	0.10
90%	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.06
100%	0.14	0.17	0.14	0.05
Never support	0.28	0.40	0.19	0.07
<i>Sanctions risk</i>				
Always support	0.15	0.06	0.11	0.46
5%	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01
10%	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01
20%	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.03
30%	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01
40%	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.04
50%	0.11	0.09	0.15	0.12
60%	0.03	0.01	0.07	0.04
70%	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.04
80%	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.04
90%	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04
100%	0.10	0.12	0.09	0.05
Never support	0.38	0.51	0.27	0.11


Table 12: Support for Concessions and Sanctions Cost in Tabular Form

	All	Right	Center	Left
Always support	0.23	0.05	0.21	0.61
1%	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.06
5%	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.04
10%	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.09
25%	0.05	0.02	0.09	0.05
50%	0.05	0.04	0.09	0.03
75%	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.01
100%	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.03
Never support	0.46	0.74	0.35	0.10

Table 13: Support for Substantial Withdrawal by Political Bloc and Coalitions

	Percent damage to exports	R	C	L	Narrow right coalition	Right-center coalition
1	Always support	0.05	0.21	0.61	0.05	0.25
2	1%	0.07	0.26	0.66	0.07	0.30
3	5%	0.10	0.31	0.70	0.10	0.34
4	10%	0.14	0.36	0.78	0.14	0.40
5	25%	0.16	0.45	0.83	0.16	0.47
6	50%	0.20	0.54	0.86	0.20	0.53
7	75%	0.22	0.58	0.87	0.22	0.56
8	100%	0.26	0.65	0.90	0.27	0.61
9	Never support	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Figure 7: Support for Concessions by Cost, Disaggregated by Ideology



2.3 Conjoint Interactions

We examine the interaction effects of policy attributes. Following Egami and Imai (2017), we estimate the effects of combinations of attributes on the probability of policy choice, which go beyond the sum of separate effects of each attribute. In other words, we examine how the interactions of multiple policy outcomes influence the likelihood that a certain policy is chosen. Table 14 reports the ranges of the Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) of each attribute, as well as of the Average Marginal Interaction Effects (AMIEs) when interacting the territory attribute with each of the other attributes.⁴ Results are reported for the entire sample and also broken down by ideology.⁵

Table 14 shows that the interaction of territory and security has an additional effect on policy choice — above and beyond the combined marginal effects estimated for the two attributes. However, this effect is relatively small and does not explain most of the variation in our data. For example, while the ranges of the territory and security AMEs are 0.17 and 0.24, respectively, the AMIE of the two attributes is 0.08, when considering the full sample. The pattern is similar for right-wing respondents, whose preferences over territory and security have the ranges of 0.35 and 0.12, respectively, with an interaction range of 0.05. Interestingly, the AMIE of security and territory is stronger than the AME of the territory attribute for centrist respondents, and is relatively high also for individuals identifying with the left. This supports the findings in the main text, which show that territorial control is most highly valued by right-wing respondents, who are willing to bear high security-related and economic costs to maintain it. However, centrist and leftist respondents seem to place high value on the joint effect of territory and security, suggesting that preferences over territory for these respondents are driven by material, rather than symbolic, considerations.

Table 16 presents the effect of the AMIEs of each level in the conjoint attributes. It can be seen that the AMIEs have small magnitudes and are not statistically significant. This suggests that while respondents are somewhat sensitive to the influence of other attribute levels when evaluating territorial control, the influence of these attributes is not strong enough to drive the main results reported in the paper.

⁴To estimate the AMEs and AMIEs we used the `FindIt` package in R.

⁵Note that the table reports ranges, and not the average effects themselves.

Table 14: Ranges of the Estimated Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) and Estimated Average Marginal Interaction Effects (AMIEs)

	Range
<i>All</i>	
AME	
territory	0.17
security	0.24
economy	0.18
budgets	0.11
AMIE	
territory:security	0.08
territory:economy	0.03
territory:budgets	0.05
<i>Right</i>	
AME	
territory	0.35
security	0.12
economy	0.19
budgets	0.06
AMIE	
territory:security	0.05
territory:economy	0.06
territory:budgets	0.08
<i>Center</i>	
AME	
territory	0.12
security	0.28
economy	0.19
budgets	0.13
AMIE	
territory:security	0.16
territory:economy	0.18
territory:budgets	0.08
<i>Left</i>	
AME	
territory	0.18
security	0.28
economy	0.20
budgets	0.24
AMIE	
territory:security	0.10
territory:economy	0.12
territory:budgets	0.15

Table 15: Values for Policy Outcomes in Conjoint Experiment

Attribute	Levels
Territory (<i>T</i>)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Israel will significantly strengthen its territorial control in the West Bank. 2. Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, but not from East Jerusalem. 3. Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
Security (<i>S</i>)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged. 2. Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly. 3. Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly.
Economy (<i>E</i>)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The economy will remain unchanged. 2. Israel's economy will be severely harmed. 3. Israel's economy will grow significantly.
Budget (<i>B</i>)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The security, education, and health budgets will remain unchanged. 2. The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease. 3. The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase.

Table 16: Estimated Average Marginal Interaction Effects (AMIEs)

Interaction	Level1	Level2	base	AMIE	Std.Err	2.5%CI	97.5%CI
territoryT1:securityS1	T1	S1	✓	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
territoryT1:securityS2	T1	S2		-0.01	0.03	-0.07	0.05
territoryT1:securityS3	T1	S3		-0.06	0.03	-0.13	0.01
territoryT2:securityS1	T2	S1		-0.02	0.03	-0.08	0.04
territoryT2:securityS2	T2	S2		-0.02	0.03	-0.07	0.03
territoryT2:securityS3	T2	S3		-0.03	0.02	-0.08	0.01
territoryT3:securityS1	T3	S1		-0.05	0.03	-0.11	0.01
territoryT3:securityS2	T3	S2		-0.04	0.02	-0.09	0.01
territoryT3:securityS3	T3	S3		0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.07
territoryT1:economyE1	T1	E1	✓	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
territoryT1:economyE2	T1	E2		-0.01	0.03	-0.06	0.05
territoryT1:economyE3	T1	E3		-0.02	0.03	-0.09	0.04
territoryT2:economyE1	T2	E1		0.00	0.03	-0.05	0.06
territoryT2:economyE2	T2	E2		-0.02	0.02	-0.07	0.02
territoryT2:economyE3	T2	E3		-0.01	0.02	-0.05	0.04
territoryT3:economyE1	T3	E1		-0.03	0.03	-0.09	0.03
territoryT3:economyE2	T3	E2		0.00	0.02	-0.04	0.04
territoryT3:economyE3	T3	E3		0.00	0.02	-0.04	0.05
territoryT1:budgetsB1	T1	B1	✓	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
territoryT1:budgetsB2	T1	B2		0.02	0.03	-0.04	0.08
territoryT1:budgetsB3	T1	B3		-0.03	0.03	-0.09	0.03
territoryT2:budgetsB1	T2	B1		0.02	0.03	-0.04	0.07
territoryT2:budgetsB2	T2	B2		-0.03	0.02	-0.08	0.01
territoryT2:budgetsB3	T2	B3		0.00	0.02	-0.04	0.05
territoryT3:budgetsB1	T3	B1		-0.03	0.03	-0.09	0.03
territoryT3:budgetsB2	T3	B2		-0.00	0.02	-0.05	0.04
territoryT3:budgetsB3	T3	B3		0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.06

3 Question Wording for Main Paper Results

Credibility Exercise

1. *Terrorism risk.* Imagine that the Israeli government is considering a number of far-reaching gestures to strengthen the Palestinian Authority. These measures have an advantage and a disadvantage: On the one hand, they could lead to a substantial reduction in terrorism, of about 100 attacks a year, due to improved security cooperation with the Palestinians. On the other hand, should the gestures fail, they could strengthen Hamas and increase terrorism by about 30 attacks a year. Please indicate when you would support the political gestures based solely on the information given in the question.

- I will support the gestures in any case
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 5%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 10%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 20%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 30%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 40%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 50%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 60%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 70%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 80%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 90%
- I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 100%
- I will not support the gestures under any circumstance

2. *Sanctions risk.* In the current political situation, Israel earns approximately a billion dollars a year from international trade. Recently, the U.N. Security Council was considering sanctions due to ongoing military occupation of the Occupied Territories. A team of senior experts estimated that implementation of the sanctions would lead to annual losses of 300 million dollars a year for the Israeli economy. The sanctions could be prevented by ending the occupation through mutual agreement with the Palestinians. Considering the risk of sanctions, when would you support such an agreement?

- I will support such an agreement in any case
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 5%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 10%

- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 20%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 30%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 40%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 50%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 60%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 70%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 80%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 90%
- I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 100%
- I will not support the agreement under any circumstance

Valuation Exercise

The European Union is Israel's chief trading partner: Israeli exports to the EU are estimated at around 14 billion dollars a year. In 2015, the EU decided to label products from Israeli settlements, a decision whose damage to the country is estimated at around \$50 million a year. Following the lack of progress in peace negotiations, the EU has begun discussing imposing additional sanctions on Israel. A senior and non-partisan team of experts from the Israel Central Bank estimated that if the sanctions are approved, the Israeli economy could be severely harmed, even if Israel increases its presence in alternative markets in Asia, Africa, and America. The Netanyahu government can avoid sanctions only if it agrees to substantial withdrawal from the territories of the West Bank as part of a peace agreement. Given the size of possible damage to the Israeli economy described below, under what conditions, if any, would you support withdrawal from the territories of Judea and Samarea?

- I will support withdrawal in any case
- I will support withdrawal if sanctions cause damage in the amount of at least 140 million dollars annually (around 1% of exports to Europe)
- I will support withdrawal if sanctions cause damage in the amount of at least 700 million dollars annually (around 5% of exports to Europe)
- I will support withdrawal if sanctions cause damage in the amount of at least 1.5 billion dollars annually (around 10% of exports to Europe)
- I will support withdrawal if sanctions cause damage in the amount of at least 3.5 billion dollars annually (around 25% of exports to Europe)

- I will support withdrawal if sanctions cause damage in the amount of at least 7 billion dollars annually (around 50% of exports to Europe)
- I will support withdrawal if sanctions cause damage in the amount of at least 10 billion dollars annually (around 75% of exports to Europe)
- I will support withdrawal if sanctions cause damage in the amount of at least 14 billion dollars annually (100% of exports to Europe)
- I will not support withdrawal under any circumstance

Political ideology

Political Ideology. Which party did you vote for in the last elections, held in March 2015 elections?

- Likud (Benjamin Netanyahu)
- Zionist Camp (Herzog, Zippy Livni)
- Yesh Atid (Yair Lapid)
- Kulanu (Moshe Kachlon)
- The Jewish Home (Naftali Bennett)
- Israel Beitenu (Avigdor Lieberman)
- Shas
- Meretz
- United Torah Judaism
- The Joint List (Ayman Odeh)
- The Greens / Ale Yarok
- Other
- I did not vote

Demographic Questions

1. Age

- 18-29
- 30-39

- 40-49
- 50-59
- 60 and above

2. Area of residence:

- Jerusalem
- The north
- Haifa
- The center
- Tel-Aviv and Gush Dan
- The south
- The West Bank

3. Which of the following best describes your religiosity?

- Secular
- Traditional
- Religious
- Haredi

4. What is your highest education attainment?

- No matriculation
- High school with matriculation
- Post high-school without academic degree
- Academic degree or student towards academic degree

5. The average monthly gross per capita income in Israel is about 9,300 NIS. Is your income:

- Much less than the average
- Little less than the average
- Around average
- Little more than the average
- Much more than the average

6. Which of the following best describes your ethnic origin?

- Mizrachi
- Ashkenazi

- A mixed ethnic origin
- Former Soviet Union
- Ethiopia
- Other

4 Second Wave Survey Design and Results

4.1 Study design

The research design of our second survey wave consisted of three distinct survey measures. First, we directly examined the attitudes of respondents towards territorial policies, asking whether they support deepening or loosening territorial control and what they expect will be the outcome of the policy they support. Next, we conducted a conjoint experiment designed to assess which respondents prioritize territorial control over salient, material benefits in security, economics, and social welfare. Third, we employed a “credibility exercise,” assessing the level of risk respondents are willing to bear to reap potential benefits of territorial compromise. After presenting each of these elements, we turn to an analysis of why the distribution matters for policy making.

4.2 Experiment 1: policy support and its determinants

4.2.1 Design

The goal of our first experiment is to identify the share of Israelis that are attached to the West Bank—conceptualized as support for deepening territorial control—and to gauge the extent to which respondents’ policy position is rooted in perceived tangible costs and benefits. As an indicator of territorial attachment we examine attitudes toward Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank. Since Israel’s occupation of the territory in 1967, the construction of settlements has served as the central means of entrenching Israeli sovereignty in the area. Today, there are over 120 settlements in the West Bank and nearly 100 settlement outposts. These communities and the areas under their control cover close to 40% of West Bank territory and are off limits to Palestinian construction.⁶ The results of the territorial attachment question are based on a sample of 813 respondents.

While individual motivations for residing in settlements are diverse, and include ideological as well as practical and economic motivations, the goal of Israeli settlement policy has been interpreted by Israelis, Palestinians, and the international community as a means of deepening control of the disputed territory and preventing territorial compromise. In contrast, the freezing of settlement construction has indicated an implicit recognition by the Israeli government that sovereignty over

⁶Data from Israeli NGO B’Tselem.

the West Bank is, at the very least, disputed. As a result, attitudes towards settlement expansion best capture territorial attachment in the Israeli case.⁷

Participants first read the following introductory text: *“You are now asked to read a brief background paragraph and then a number of reports about the actions of the Israeli government. The reports are hypothetical, but are based on similar reports published in the news in the past. At the end of each news report you’ll be asked to answer a number of questions.”* Respondents then read the following brief description of the situation in the West Bank: *“According to the Israeli Central Statistics Bureau, the Israeli population in 2013 numbered approximately 8 million. Of these, about 300,000 Israelis live in about 120 settlements constructed outside the Green Line, in the territories of Judea and Samarea. In addition, approximately 2,264,000 Palestinians live in these Territories. Israeli citizens constitute 10% of the population of the West Bank and Palestinians constitute 90%.”*

Next, participants were presented with simulated news reports concerning Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank, designed to conform as closely as possible to actual news articles from recent years. We randomly varied whether territorial control was deepened or loosened, by exposing half of respondents to a policy increasing the construction of settlements, and the other half to a policy freezing the construction of settlements. The full text of the vignette follows:

Settlement freeze *Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank was frozen yesterday. The settlement freeze is expected to continue in the near future. Experts estimate that freezing construction will significantly improve Palestinian livelihood. A government source said that the policy was enacted in accordance with a decision by the Israeli Security Cabinet, and stated that it advances Israel’s national interests and is aligned with Israel’s commitment to pursue a just and long lasting peace.*

Settlement expansion *In the last quarter there has been a sharp increase in settlement construction in the West Bank. The construction is expected to continue in the near future. Experts estimate that the accelerated construction will significantly harm Palestinian livelihood. A government source said that the policy was enacted in accordance with a decision by the Israeli Security Cabinet, and stated that it advances Israel’s national interests and is aligned with Israel’s commitment to pursue a just and long lasting peace.*

After reading the policy vignette, respondents were first asked to state whether or not they support the government policy on a four-point scale ranging from “strongly oppose” to “strongly support.” Respondents were then asked their assessment of the policy’s likely consequences for four tangible outcomes that are central to the public’s debate regarding the fate of the West Bank: (1) Palestinian violence in the short-term; (2) Palestinian violence in the long-term; (3) the state of

⁷While we view policy toward settlement expansion and contraction as the key indicator of territorial control, we also examined other policy positions including checkpoint construction/removal and military operations, arriving at essentially similar findings. Results of these alternative policy support experiments can be shared upon request.


the Israeli economy; (4) the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement with the Palestinians. Here, respondents were asked to evaluate whether the policy is expected to worsen, leave unchanged, or improve each of the outcomes.

4.2.2 Results

To gauge overall levels of support for the two opposing settlement policies, we use a binary variable that is equal to one if the respondent supports the policy described in the vignette and zero otherwise.⁸ We find that the majority of respondents exposed to the settlement construction vignette (53%), express support for that policy, while a smaller share of respondents (47%), express support for a settlement freeze.

Figure 8 breaks down support for both policies by political ideology, which is expected to crucially determine support for settlement expansion. Consistent with Israeli polling data, a majority of respondents (53%) self-identified as right-wing, while only 22% of the sample identified as left-wing.⁹ Among those identifying as the left (1-3 on the ideological scale) and the center (ideology scale equals 4) support for settlement freezing is far higher than for settlement construction, while the opposite is true among right-wing Jewish Israelis (5-7 on the scale).

Figure 8: Support for Territorial Policies by Ideology



These results allow us to identify the share of respondents that supports deepening territorial control but do not reveal why respondents are more likely to support settlement construction:

⁸Results from our first wave are consistent with those of the second, despite surveying different samples in very different political climates. We do not pool the two waves since we used slightly different measures in each. For first wave results see Section 3.

⁹See for example the Peace Index poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute and Tel Aviv University at <http://en.idi.org.il/tools-and-data/the-guttman-center-for-public-opinion-and-policy-research/the-peace-index/>

because they view it as less costly than settlement freezing, or because they support it despite its costs. We therefore turn to an examination of public assessment of each policy’s consequences. Do respondents believe that territorial control enhances their security or benefits the country materially, or do they view the policy as costly? For each outcome examined, we estimate and plot predicted probabilities for an ordered logit model in which the main treatment is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for settlement expansion and 0 for a settlement freeze. In all models, the dependent variable can take one of three categories, corresponding to the policy’s expected effect on each outcome: worsen, leave unchanged, or improve. We present predicted probabilities for the “worsen” outcome by political ideology.

Focusing first on respondents identifying with center-left, Figures 9 and 10 show that they view settlement expansion as more likely than settlement freezing to increase short and long term violence, harm the economy and reduce the likelihood of reaching a peaceful resolution of the conflict. This provides a rather strong indication that the center-left policy position, which opposes deepening territorial control and believes that it will have negative consequences, is shaped by tangible considerations of security and economic welfare, as predicted by rationalist theories.

Interestingly, the policy assessment patterns of the right are not very different than those of the center-left (though smaller in magnitude). Right-wing respondents, too, believe that policies that deepen territorial control are more likely to escalate conflict in both the short and long-term and reduce the likelihood of signing a peace agreement with the Palestinians. These perceptions, by a solid majority of the Israeli electorate, stand in remarkable contrast to their overwhelming support for deepening territorial control, and could indicate attachment to territory for intangible reasons. However, it may also result from concerns about rival commitment. We investigate these results using a conjoint experiment, which we describe in the next section.¹⁰

¹⁰A relatively small subset of far-right respondents views a settlement freeze as more harmful for the economy, but this does not seem to be large enough to explain the overwhelming support for settlement expansion among the far right, as we further demonstrate in the next section.

Figure 9: Evaluation of Territorial Policy: Violence





Figure 10: Evaluation of Territorial Policy: Economy and Peace



4.3 Experiment 2: Conjoint experiment

Findings from Experiment 1 are, in principle, consistent with both rationalist and symbolic theories. From a rationalist perspective, it may be that individuals support costly policies due to the risk that even greater costs would result from rival defection. From a symbolic perspective, this share of the population might view territory as salient beyond its strategic and material value. As the first step in separating the two, we employ a conjoint experiment (see main paper for a description of this approach and its advantages).

4.3.1 Design

Our experiment asks participants to consider a hypothetical scenario in which the Israeli government is considering implementing one of two policies that may substantially change the Israeli-Palestinian status quo. After a brief introduction explaining the task, we showed participants possible attributes of two generic policies (“A” and “B”) as shown in Table 17. The instructions asked participants to imagine that the government is turning to the public to decide between the two policies in a plebiscite and indicate which of the two policy proposals they would support.

Each policy had four attributes that varied along the domains that are central to policy debates in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the policy’s effect on *security*, *the economy*, *budget allocation to social services versus defense*, and Israel’s ability to maintain its control over the disputed *territory*. Each likely outcome (attribute) took one of several values, as described in Table 18. For example, the policy’s impact on security was operationalized as its effect on terrorist and rocket attacks, since this has been perceived by Israel as the primary threat to its security since the decline of the conventional military threat posed to it by its neighbors after the end of the Cold War.¹¹ Values on this item ranged from a substantial decrease in rockets and terrorist attacks to a substantial increase in such attacks. In the territorial domain, values varied between maintaining territorial control of the West Bank and withdrawing from the territory.

Following Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014), we calculate average marginal component effects (AMCEs), which estimate the average difference in the probability that a policy with a given outcome—say, a reduction in rocket attacks—is preferred over a policy with a baseline outcome—such as no change in the level of rocket attacks. Since the attributes (i.e., the outcomes) of a policy are randomly assigned, each outcome in a given domain is combined with the same distribution of outcomes in the other domains on average, which allows for a simple comparison of mean values. We estimate the AMCEs using a regression of a binary outcome variable: *Policy chosen* on a set of factor variables for each outcome in each domain. Since each respondent chooses between two policies, there are two possible policy profiles for each respondent. To obtain accurate

¹¹A second strategic threat, that of a nuclear Iran, is irrelevant to the territorial control of the West Bank.

standard errors, we cluster standard errors by respondent ID.

$$Policy\ chosen_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_{i,2} + \beta_2 S_{i,2} + \beta_3 S_{i,3} + \beta_4 E_{i,2} + \beta_5 E_{i,3} + \beta_6 B_{i,2} + \beta_7 B_{i,3} + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

Table 17: Experimental Design

After the recent military operation in Gaza, the Israeli government came to the conclusion that it needs to take an action that may have a strong impact on Israel's economy, security, and social arenas. Below are the consequences of two possible policies:

	Policy A	Policy B
Territory	Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged	Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank
Security	Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly	Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged
Economy	Israel's economy will be severely harmed	Israel's economy will grow significantly
Budget	The security, education, and health budgets will remain in their present form	The security budget will decrease, and the education and health budgets will increase

The Israeli government turns to the public to decide between these two policies in a plebiscite. Based on the information presented in the table above, which policy would you support?

1. Policy A
2. Policy B

Table 18: Values for Policy Outcomes in Conjoint Experiment

Attribute	Levels
Territory (T)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged. 2. Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank.
Security (S)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged. 2. Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly. 3. Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly.
Economy (E)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The economy will remain unchanged. 2. Israel's economy will be severely harmed. 3. Israel's economy will grow significantly.
Budget (B)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The security, education, and health budgets will remain unchanged. 2. The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease. 3. The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase.

4.3.2 Balance tests

Tables 4 through 7 report balance tests for each domain in the conjoint experiment in the second survey wave.

Table 19: Balance Table: Conjoint Territory Attributes

	Mean (Territory: no change)	Std. Dev. (Territory: no change)	Mean (Territory: no change)	Std. Dev. (Territory: no change)	Diff.	Pval
<i>Other conjoint domains</i>						
Security	2.00	0.83	2.00	0.82	0.00	0.92
Economy	1.98	0.82	1.97	0.82	0.02	0.62
Budgets	1.98	0.81	2.00	0.81	-0.02	0.47
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>						
Age	41.01	14.29	41.01	14.29	0.00	1.00
Female	0.54	0.50	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00
Income						
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.26	0.44	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.19	0.39	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.20	0.40	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.18	0.38	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.10	0.29	0.10	0.29	0.00	1.00
Education						
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.26	0.44	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
<i>High school</i>	0.22	0.42	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00
<i>Vocational</i>	0.22	0.42	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00
<i>Academic</i>	0.30	0.46	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Area of residence						
<i>WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.14	0.34	0.14	0.34	0.00	1.00
<i>Outside WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.86	0.34	0.86	0.34	0.00	1.00
Religiosity						
<i>Secular</i>	0.55	0.50	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
<i>Traditional</i>	0.21	0.41	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
<i>Religious</i>	0.13	0.34	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00
<i>Haredi</i>	0.10	0.30	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
Ethnicity						
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.34	0.47	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.44	0.50	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00

Table 20: Balance Table: Conjoint Security Attributes

	Mean (Security: no change)	Std. Dev. (Security: no change)	Mean (Security: less terrorism)	Std. Dev. (Security: less terrorism)	Diff.	Pval	Mean (Security: more terrorism)	Std. Dev. (Security: more terrorism)	Diff.	Pval
<i>Other conjoint domains</i>										
Territory	1.49	0.50	1.52	0.50	-0.02	0.39	1.49	0.50	0.00	0.92
Economy	1.98	0.81	1.97	0.83	0.01	0.74	1.98	0.83	-0.00	1.00
Budgets	2.00	0.81	2.01	0.83	-0.01	0.78	1.96	0.79	0.04	0.34
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>										
Age	41.50	14.03	40.94	14.37	0.56	0.43	40.58	14.46	0.92	0.19
Female	0.54	0.50	0.55	0.50	-0.01	0.68	0.53	0.50	0.01	0.72
Income										
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.24	0.43	0.26	0.44	-0.02	0.36	0.28	0.45	-0.04	0.07
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.19	0.39	0.19	0.39	-0.00	1.00	0.18	0.38	0.01	0.56
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.22	0.41	0.19	0.39	0.03	0.16	0.19	0.39	0.03	0.11
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.17	0.38	0.19	0.39	-0.01	0.57	0.18	0.38	-0.00	0.95
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.10	0.30	0.09	0.29	0.01	0.67	0.10	0.30	0.00	0.96
Education										
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.26	0.44	0.26	0.44	-0.00	0.98	0.25	0.43	0.02	0.44
<i>High school</i>	0.24	0.42	0.22	0.41	0.02	0.41	0.21	0.41	0.03	0.21
<i>Vocational</i>	0.21	0.41	0.22	0.42	-0.01	0.55	0.24	0.42	-0.03	0.18
<i>Academic</i>	0.29	0.46	0.30	0.46	-0.00	0.85	0.31	0.46	-0.01	0.51
Area of residence										
<i>WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.13	0.33	0.14	0.35	-0.02	0.30	0.14	0.35	-0.01	0.46
<i>Outside WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.87	0.33	0.86	0.35	0.02	0.30	0.86	0.35	0.01	0.46
Religiosity										
<i>Secular</i>	0.57	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.03	0.29	0.54	0.50	0.04	0.13
<i>Traditional</i>	0.20	0.40	0.22	0.42	-0.02	0.40	0.22	0.41	-0.01	0.56
<i>Religious</i>	0.13	0.33	0.13	0.33	0.00	0.95	0.13	0.34	-0.01	0.70
<i>Haradi</i>	0.09	0.29	0.10	0.31	-0.01	0.50	0.11	0.32	-0.02	0.21
Ethnicity										
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.34	0.47	0.35	0.48	-0.01	0.71	0.33	0.47	0.01	0.64
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.46	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.03	0.25	0.45	0.50	0.01	0.78

Table 21: Balance Table: Conjoint Economy Attributes

	Mean (Economy: no change)	Std. Dev. (Economy: no change)	Mean (Economy: harmed)	Std. Dev. (Economy: harmed)	Diff.	Pval	Mean (Economy: grow)	Std. Dev. (Economy: grow)	Diff.	Pval
<i>Other conjoint domains</i>										
Territory	1.50	0.50	1.50	0.50	0.00	0.93	1.49	0.50	0.01	0.62
Security	2.02	0.82	1.97	0.83	0.05	0.21	2.02	0.82	-0.00	0.97
Budgets	1.94	0.81	2.01	0.80	-0.07	0.07	2.01	0.82	-0.07	0.10
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>										
Age	41.61	14.37	40.62	13.95	0.99	0.16	40.74	14.52	0.87	0.22
Female	0.53	0.50	0.56	0.50	-0.02	0.32	0.52	0.50	0.01	0.61
Income										
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.27	0.44	0.26	0.44	0.01	0.78	0.25	0.43	0.02	0.46
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.18	0.38	0.18	0.38	-0.00	0.89	0.20	0.40	-0.03	0.19
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.21	0.41	0.17	0.38	0.04	0.07	0.21	0.41	-0.00	0.90
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.17	0.38	0.19	0.39	-0.01	0.55	0.17	0.38	0.00	0.95
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.09	0.28	0.10	0.31	-0.02	0.20	0.10	0.30	-0.01	0.38
Education										
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.26	0.44	0.25	0.43	0.01	0.64	0.27	0.44	-0.01	0.73
<i>High school</i>	0.23	0.42	0.22	0.42	0.01	0.74	0.21	0.41	0.02	0.36
<i>Vocational</i>	0.22	0.41	0.23	0.42	-0.01	0.67	0.22	0.42	-0.01	0.69
<i>Academic</i>	0.30	0.46	0.30	0.46	-0.01	0.72	0.30	0.46	-0.00	0.90
Area of residence										
<i>WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.13	0.33	0.14	0.35	-0.01	0.38	0.14	0.35	-0.01	0.44
<i>Outside WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.87	0.33	0.86	0.35	0.01	0.38	0.86	0.35	0.01	0.44
Religiosity										
<i>Secular</i>	0.56	0.50	0.56	0.50	0.00	0.98	0.55	0.50	0.01	0.69
<i>Traditional</i>	0.22	0.41	0.22	0.41	0.00	0.86	0.21	0.41	0.01	0.52
<i>Religious</i>	0.13	0.34	0.12	0.33	0.01	0.51	0.13	0.34	0.00	0.81
<i>Haredi</i>	0.09	0.29	0.10	0.31	-0.02	0.30	0.12	0.32	-0.03	0.07
Ethnicity										
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.36	0.48	0.32	0.47	0.04	0.10	0.34	0.47	0.02	0.41
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.43	0.50	0.45	0.50	-0.02	0.42	0.45	0.50	-0.02	0.41

Table 22: Balance Table: Conjoint Budget Attributes

	Mean (Budget: no change)	Std. Dev. (Budget: no change)	Mean (Budget: social services decrease)	Std. Dev. (Budget: social services decrease)	Diff.	Pval	Mean (Budget: social services increase)	Std. Dev. (Budget: social services increase)	Diff.	Pval
<i>Other conjoint domains</i>										
Territory	1.49	0.50	1.50	0.50	-0.00	0.86	1.51	0.50	-0.02	0.47
Security	2.01	0.82	2.02	0.84	-0.01	0.78	1.97	0.81	0.04	0.34
Economy	1.94	0.83	1.97	0.81	-0.03	0.51	2.01	0.82	-0.07	0.09
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>										
Age	41.11	14.33	41.06	14.23	0.05	0.94	40.85	14.31	0.26	0.72
Female	0.53	0.50	0.54	0.50	-0.01	0.71	0.54	0.50	-0.01	0.59
Income										
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.27	0.44	0.25	0.43	0.02	0.42	0.26	0.44	0.00	0.87
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.19	0.39	0.19	0.39	0.00	0.98	0.18	0.38	0.01	0.64
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.18	0.39	0.20	0.40	-0.02	0.37	0.21	0.41	-0.03	0.16
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.17	0.37	0.19	0.39	-0.03	0.16	0.18	0.38	-0.01	0.63
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.11	0.31	0.09	0.29	0.01	0.37	0.09	0.28	0.02	0.20
Education										
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.25	0.43	0.27	0.44	-0.02	0.41	0.26	0.44	-0.01	0.65
<i>High school</i>	0.23	0.42	0.21	0.41	0.02	0.36	0.22	0.42	0.01	0.68
<i>Vocational</i>	0.22	0.41	0.22	0.41	0.00	0.98	0.23	0.42	-0.01	0.68
<i>Academic</i>	0.30	0.46	0.30	0.46	-0.00	0.95	0.29	0.45	0.01	0.67
Area of residence										
<i>WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.15	0.35	0.12	0.33	0.02	0.17	0.14	0.34	0.01	0.59
<i>Outside WB or Jerusalem</i>	0.85	0.35	0.88	0.33	-0.02	0.17	0.86	0.34	-0.01	0.59
Religiosity										
<i>Secular</i>	0.54	0.50	0.56	0.50	-0.02	0.37	0.56	0.50	-0.02	0.42
<i>Traditional</i>	0.22	0.41	0.22	0.42	-0.01	0.78	0.20	0.40	0.01	0.52
<i>Religious</i>	0.14	0.35	0.12	0.32	0.03	0.10	0.13	0.34	0.01	0.52
<i>Haredi</i>	0.10	0.30	0.10	0.30	-0.00	1.00	0.11	0.31	-0.00	0.79
Ethnicity										
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.34	0.47	0.34	0.48	-0.00	0.96	0.33	0.47	0.01	0.65
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.44	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.01	0.60	0.46	0.50	-0.01	0.58

4.3.3 Results


Figure 11 shows results for the full sample, plotting the AMCEs along with 95% confidence intervals. The point estimate on each attribute represents its average effect on the probability that participants choose a policy containing this attribute over a policy with the baseline attribute. Points without confidence intervals denote baseline attributes. As Figure 11 shows, a policy that results in withdrawal from the West Bank is 34.8 percentage points less likely to be chosen, all else equal, representing the largest effect by far on policy choice. A policy leading to an increase in rocket attacks is 18.6 percentage points less likely to be selected, and a policy that reduces terrorist violence increases the probability of policy choice by 19.2 percentage points. In the economic domain, economic harm decreases the likelihood of a policy being chosen by 12.1 percentage points, while in the budget domain, a policy leading to an increase in allocation to security at the expense of health and education is 6.7 percentage points less likely to be chosen.

Since territorial attachment is conditioned on political ideology, we present the conjoint results disaggregated by the three key political blocs in Israel.¹² Consistent with our earlier results, Figure 12 reveals that territorial control is secondary to security considerations and to the state of the economy among center and left-leaning respondents, reflecting our finding that for such voters, tangible material considerations crucially shape policy preferences. By contrast, Figure 12 further shows that control over land plays a decisive role in the policy considerations of right-wing voters, dwarfing security and material considerations, which hardly factor into right-wing voters' preference formation. These findings confirm that instrumental considerations cannot account for the right's overwhelming support for settlement construction in the policy experiment described above.

The fact that for many right-wing voters territorial control takes precedence over economic and security considerations, by itself, is not evidence of intangible preferences. Recall that intangibility entails willingness to bear substantial material costs to retain territorial control. We thus assess whether voters value land for tangible or intangible reasons by estimating the share of respondents that would prefer maintaining control over the West Bank, even when it entails significant costs. We further investigate this possibility by estimating the proportion that would be willing to support territorial concessions only when their security or livelihood would not be harmed. We do so by calculating predicted values of respondents' policy choice from the conjoint experiment, while holding the four policy attributes at specific values. We report the results in Figure 13.


¹²We code respondents as “left” if they identified as 1-3 on the seven-point ideology scale described above; “right” if they identified as 5-7; and center if they identified as 4.

Figure 11: Effects of Policy Attributes on Probability of Policy Choice



Note: The figure plots AMCEs of randomly assigned policy attributes on the probability of a policy being chosen by survey participants. Estimates are based on the OLS regression model reported in equation 1, with standard errors clustered by respondent. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Points without horizontal bars represent baseline attribute values.

Figure 12: Effects of Policy Attributes on Probability of Policy Choice by Ideology



Note: The figure plots AMCEs of randomly assigned policy attributes on the probability of a policy being chosen by survey participants, broken down by ideological self-placement. Estimates are based on the OLS regression model reported in equation 1, with standard errors clustered by respondent. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Points without horizontal bars represent baseline attribute values.

Focusing on the results for right-wing voters, reported in the top panel of Figure 13, we find that about 45% of right-wing voters are willing to support a policy that results in territorial compromise (“give land”) if the policy is expected to reduce terror and rocket attacks, improve the economy and allocate greater resources towards social services (“all else good”). This finding suggests that this group of right-wing constituents is highly attached to territory but for tangible reasons. If benefits of concessions are high (and guaranteed), they would be willing to support a policy that results in withdrawal from the West Bank. For this group of right-wing voters, a bargaining space can thus be said to exist.

On the other hand, we find that over 50 percent of right-wing voters explicitly prefer retaining control over the West Bank *even when terrorist violence increases substantially, the economy is severely harmed, and the budget allocation to health and education is reduced* (“all else bad”). This group, representing about a third of all respondents, can be said to hold intangible territorial attachment. For them, no bargaining space exists, rendering the territory effectively indivisible.¹³


Though very informative, one limitation of the conjoint experiment is that it does not allow us to easily address the credible commitment problem; i.e., the idea that voters might fear that Palestinians would exploit concessions to impose greater costs, or that a chain of events—such as a Hamas takeover of the West Bank—would undermine or put an end to any agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Put differently, analysis of the conjoint cannot rule out the possibility that some respondents classified as holding “intangible” preferences would change their position and support territorial concessions if they could be assured of an agreement’s credibility. In the next section we present the results of a third activity designed explicitly to measure the extent to which credible commitment lies at the heart of (some) voters’ rejection of territorial compromise.

4.3.4 Conjoint interactions

Figure 14 reports the ranges of the causal effects of each attribute. Note that the figure reports ranges, and not the average effects themselves. Observing Average Marginal Interaction Effects (AMIEs), it can be seen that the interaction of territory and security has an additional effect on policy choice, as well as the interaction of security and the economy. The three-way interaction between territory, security, and the economy also has an additional influence on policy choice. However, all these interactions are not large enough to drive the Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) of each attribute, which have significantly larger ranges.


¹³By randomizing attributes of an object, conjoint experiments intend to manipulate beliefs about a specific attributes and only those beliefs. In any conjoint experiment, however, subjects may nonetheless consider prior beliefs not explicitly stated in the conjoint when selecting among alternatives. For example, respondents may continue to implicitly consider other material attributes when choosing policies that maintain control over the West Bank. Still, we believe that the fact that more than 50% of right-wing respondents would reject policies that entail territorial compromise even when “all is bad” suggests that this possible confounding is unlikely to be driving the conjoint results.

Figure 13: Preferences for Maintaining Territorial Control (By Ideology)



Note: The figure plots predicted values, by ideology, of policy choice while holding the attributes reported in Table 18 at specific values. For “Keep land (all else good),” we set the Territory indicator to “Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged”; the Security indicator to “Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly”; The Economy indicator to “Israel’s economy will grow significantly”; and the Budget indicator to “The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase.” For “Give land (all else good)” we changed the Territory indicator to “Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank.” For “Keep land (all else bad)” we set the territory indicator to territorial withdrawal and the other indicators to “Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly”, “Israel’s economy will be severely harmed,” and “The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease.”

Figure 14: Estimated Ranges of One-Way AMCEs and Two-Way and Three-Way AMTIEs



The figure plots estimated ranges of the (one-way) Average Marginal Treatment Component effects (AMCEs), and the two-way and three-way Average Marginal Treatment Interaction Effects (AMTIEs).

4.4 Experiment 3: Credibility Exercise

One promising way to address the credible commitment problem is to measure the levels of economic and security-related *risk* that respondents are willing to assume in order to support territorial compromise. If individuals reject compromise even when there is no risk involved and the guarantee of benefits is completely credible, risk aversion and fear of rival defection cannot be driving policy positions.

4.4.1 Design

Our “credibility exercise” consists of two related questions. The first of these questions posed the following scenario to respondents:

“Imagine that the Israeli government is considering a number of far-reaching gestures to strengthen the Palestinian Authority (PA). These measures have an advantage and a disadvantage: On the one hand, they could lead to a substantial reduction in terrorism, of about 100 attacks a year, due to improved security cooperation with the Palestinians. On the other hand, should the gestures fail, they could strengthen Hamas and increase terrorism by about 30 attacks a year.”

Respondents were then asked to state when they would support the political gestures based solely on the information given in the question. Response categories ranged from “I will support the gestures in any case” through “I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 5%,” and continued in intervals of 10% until they reached “I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is 100%” and finally “I will not support the gestures under any circumstances.” Notably, this question did not explicitly reference territorial withdrawal but a “series of political gestures,” which in Israel implies increased PA control in the West Bank.

Our second question followed a similar format but highlighted material rather than security considerations:

“Currently, Israel earns approximately a billion dollars a year from international trade. Recently, the U.N. Security Council has begun to discuss international sanctions against Israel due to continued military rule in the Territories. A team of senior experts estimated that if the sanctions are approved, the Israeli economy will lose approximately 300 million dollars a year. The Israeli government can avoid sanctions only if it ends the current political situation by an agreement with the Palestinians. Given the risk of sanctions, at what point would you support such an agreement?”



Again, response categories ranged from “I will support such an agreement in any case” through “I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 5%,” and continued in intervals of 10% until they reached “I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is 100%” and finally “I will not support the agreement under any circumstances.”

4.4.2 Results

The conjoint experiment pointed to important variation among right-wing voters in the extent to which material and security considerations factor into policy preferences over the disputed territory. Similarly, the top panel of Figure 15 demonstrates that among those identifying as right-wing there is a large variability with respect to risk tolerance. On the one hand, about a half would support concessions if the likelihood of success in reducing terrorism is greater than fifty percent. This is consistent with results from our conjoint experiment, which indicate that around 45% of right-wing voters would concede territory if all other material outcomes were positive. On the other hand, a plurality of right-wing voters (about 40%) would never support concessions, regardless of the level of credibility. Similarly, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 15, when economic issues are at stake, around 38% of respondents would refuse to end the military occupation even with the certainty of severe economic sanctions, though here, too, right-wing voters are divided. Figure 16 reports the results for the entire sample.


In sum, across both domains – security and the economy – we find that a large minority (around 30-40%) of our sample is insensitive to important costs and benefits when territorial control is at stake. Though on their own, results from each experiment could perhaps have been interpreted not as symbolic preferences but as the result of myopia or cognitive biases, the fact that three different experiments all produce substantively similar results increases our confidence that our findings reflect a deliberate tradeoff between tangible and intangible values. Simply put, the cumulative evidence indicates that a large share of Israeli respondents is willing to escalate conflict, risk economic sanctions and forgo welfare benefits in order to retain control of the West Bank. This distribution of preferences renders the bargaining space of leaders exceedingly limited.

Figure 15: Support for Concessions and Risk Taking among Right-Wing Voters



Note: The figure plots the distribution of responses for level of risk survey participants are willing to take when supporting potentially beneficial Israeli concessions.

Figure 16: Support for Concessions and Risk Taking by Political Bloc



Note: The figure plots the distribution of responses for level of risk survey participants are willing to take when supporting potentially beneficial Israeli concessions, broken by ideological identification.


4.5 Why Territorial Preferences Matter: From Public Opinion To Policy Making

One advantage of our “credibility exercise” is that it allows us to aggregate respondents’ risk tolerance of territorial concessions using demand curves that provide a graphical representation of the bargaining space of leaders. Figure 17 plots the share of respondents that support concessions for different levels of risk that respondents agree to assume. In the left panel we present results for those who self-identify as left on the political ideology scale. The graph is relatively elastic and generally linear, showing that, for every 10% decrease in the risks of terrorism, there is approximately the same increase in the proportion of people supporting concessions. A majority supports concessions when risks are slightly lower than 50%, represented by horizontal red line. In contrast, the right panel shows that those identifying as right-wing have fairly inelastic demand curves: the proportion supporting concessions doesn’t begin to rise above 10% until the risks that the measure would increase terrorism are lower than 60%. A majority of right-wingers would support concessions only if they were costless or nearly so.

The pattern is similar when we examine the sensitivity of voters to economic costs and benefits of concessions (Figure 18). Here, the benefits of concessions are avoiding economic sanctions, such that as the likelihood of sanctions rises, concessions become less costly. The costs of concessions can thus be thought of as the likelihood of avoiding international sanctions. As shown in the left panel of Figure 18, the graph for left-wing voters remains fairly linear, though it is far less elastic, indicating that left-wing voters are much more sensitive to security costs than to economic costs in their support for concessions: a majority supports concessions even when the risk of sanctions is low (15%). As for the right-wing, the pattern is fairly similar to security risks: a majority will support concessions to avoid sanctions only when the risk of sanctions being imposed is close to being assured.


Figure 19 plots the demand curve for concessions by terrorism risk for each coalition, as measured by voters for the parties included in the coalition. It shows that, unsurprisingly, the curve for a narrow right-wing government is highly inelastic, with a majority opposing concessions nearly regardless of the level of costs. Interestingly, however, a center-right government is similarly constrained, as a majority of its constituents would agree to concessions only when they involve a risk of less than 20%. This result is due to the simple reason that—as shown above—voters holding intangible preferences over the disputed territory are not necessarily concentrated in the far-right, but form a core constituency of the Likud party. In understanding “effective indivisibility” as demand inelasticity, this figure provides a graphic illustration of what a narrow bargaining space means in practice.

Figure 17: Concessions Support by Security Costs among Right-Wing and Left-Wing Voters




Note: The figure plots on the Y axis the cost of concessions in terms of percent success in reducing the level of terrorism; the cost increases as the chances of reducing terrorism decrease. The X axis plots the cumulative proportion of respondents in each bloc (left, right) who are willing to support concessions at different costs.

Figure 18: Concessions Support by Sanction Costs among Right-Wing and Left-Wing Voters



Note: The figure plots on the Y axis the risk of economic sanctions; the lower the risk, the faster respondents are willing to give away territory, which constitutes a higher cost. Thus the cost of giving away territory increases as the chances of sanctions are lower. The X axis plots the cumulative proportion of respondents in each bloc (left, right) who are willing to support concessions at different costs.

Figure 19: Bargaining Space by Government Coalition



Note: The figure plots on the Y axis the cost of concessions in terms of percent success in reducing the level of terrorism; the cost increases as the chances of reducing terrorism decrease. The X axis plots the cumulative proportion of respondents in each coalition (right-center, narrow right) who are willing to support concessions at different costs.

4.6 Selected Tabular Results

Table 23 reports the predicted values used to construct Figure 13. The figure plots predicted values for policy support when holding the conjoint attributes at three specific combinations. For “Keep land (all else good),” we set the Territory indicator to “Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged”; the Security indicator to “Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly”; The Economy indicator to “Israel’s economy will grow significantly”; and the Budget indicator to “The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase.” For “Give land (all else good)” we changed the Territory indicator to “Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank.” Finally, for “Keep land (all else bad)” we set the territory indicator to territorial withdrawal and the other three indicators to “Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly”, “Israel’s economy will be severely harmed,” and “The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease.”

Table 11 reports the results of our ‘credibility’ exercise. The top panel reports the distribution of answers (in percentages) for the question assessing support for concessions at different levels of terrorism risk. The bottom panel reports the distribution of support for ending the occupation in the West bank, at different levels of sanctions risk.

Tables 24 and 25 report the marginal effects of the deepening/loosening indicator in the regressions of policy support and evaluation described in Section 3.1. Table 24 reports the results without demographic controls; Table 25 reports the results by adding controls for age, gender, income, education, area of residence, religiosity, and ethnicity. It can be seen that in all estimations, support for settlement freeze is lower than support settlement expansion, even though settlement freeze is seen as more likely to reduce violence, improve the economy, and increase the likelihood of peace and compromise by the Palestinian Authority.

Table 23: Preferences for Maintaining Territorial Control in Tabular Form

	Estimate	95% Min	95% Max
<i>All</i>			
Keep land (all else good)	0.97	0.93	1.02
Give land (all else good)	0.62	0.57	0.68
Keep land (all else bad)	0.34	0.28	0.40
<i>Right</i>			
Keep land (all else good)	1.00	0.94	1.06
Give land (all else good)	0.41	0.34	0.49
Keep land (all else bad)	0.55	0.47	0.63
<i>Center</i>			
Keep land (all else good)	0.99	0.90	1.08
Give land (all else good)	0.73	0.62	0.84
Keep land (all else bad)	0.22	0.10	0.34
<i>Left</i>			
Keep land (all else good)	0.93	0.82	1.04
Give land (all else good)	1.05	0.93	1.16
Keep land (all else bad)	-0.02	-0.12	0.08

Table 24: Policy Support and Evaluation (Marginal Effects)

	Coefficient	SE	Pval
<i>Settlements</i>			
Policy support			
Support policy	-0.05	0.04	0.12
Policy evaluation			
Reduce: Short term violence	0.20	0.02	0.00
No change: Short term violence	0.18	0.02	0.00
Increase: Short term violence	-0.38	0.03	0.00
Reduce: Long term violence	0.19	0.02	0.00
No change: Long term violence	0.09	0.02	0.00
Increase: Long term violence	-0.28	0.03	0.00
Harm: Economy	-0.12	0.03	0.00
No change: Economy	0.03	0.01	0.00
Improve: Economy	0.10	0.02	0.00
Reduce: Likelihood of peace	-0.45	0.03	0.00
No change: Likelihood of peace	0.17	0.02	0.00
Increase: Likelihood of peace	0.28	0.02	0.00
Reduce: Likelihood of PA compromise	-0.41	0.03	0.00
No change: Likelihood of PA compromise	0.13	0.02	0.00
Increase: Likelihood of PA compromise	0.27	0.02	0.00

Note: The table reports marginal effects of a binary indicator for territorial loosening, where 1 indicates loosening and 0 denotes deepening.

Table 25: Policy Support and Evaluation (Marginal Effects, Including Controls)

	Coefficient	SE	Pval
<i>Settlements</i>			
Policy support			
Support policy	-0.07	0.04	0.07
Policy evaluation			
Reduce: Short term violence	0.19	0.02	0.00
No change: Short term violence	0.17	0.03	0.00
Increase: Short term violence	-0.36	0.03	0.00
Reduce: Long term violence	0.20	0.03	0.00
No change: Long term violence	0.08	0.02	0.00
Increase: Long term violence	-0.28	0.03	0.00
Harm: Economy	-0.10	0.03	0.00
No change: Economy	0.02	0.01	0.02
Improve: Economy	0.08	0.03	0.00
Reduce: Likelihood of peace	-0.44	0.03	0.00
No change: Likelihood of peace	0.16	0.03	0.00
Increase: Likelihood of peace	0.28	0.03	0.00
Reduce: Likelihood of PA compromise	-0.40	0.03	0.00
No change: Likelihood of PA compromise	0.12	0.02	0.00
Increase: Likelihood of PA compromise	0.28	0.03	0.00

Note: The table reports marginal effects of a binary indicator for territorial loosening, where 1 indicates loosening and 0 denotes deepening.

4.7 Sample representativeness

Figures 20 through 25 plot the distributions of age, gender, income, education, religiosity, and area of residence in the two samples. It can be seen that in terms of these key variables our sample is representative. While the distributions are not identical, they present similar patterns. In addition, we conducted Chi-squared tests to evaluate the extent to which the two samples can be considered as coming from the same population. For all six variables, we were not able to reject the null hypothesis that the type of sample (i.e., our study or the ISS survey) is independent of the distributions of these variables.

Figure 20: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Age




Figure 21: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Gender




Figure 22: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Income




Figure 23: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Education




Figure 24: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Religiosity





Figure 25: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Area of Residence



5 First Wave Survey Design and Results

5.1 Design

Similar to the second wave, the first wave showed participants a simulated news article regarding Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank. Unlike the second wave, which varied only along the territorial deepening–loosening dimension, the first wave also varied along a government identity dimension, which was manipulated to be either hawkish or dovish. After reading the policy vignette, respondents were asked to state their level of support for the policy, ranging from “strongly oppose” to “strongly support.” They were also asked to evaluate whether the policy is expected to worsen, leave unchanged, or improve the following outcomes: 1) Palestinian violence; 2) the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement with the Palestinians, and 3) the position of the Palestinian Authority in negotiations. The prompt for the policy vignettes, as well as the policy evaluation questions, were almost identical to the second wave described in Section 3.2.¹⁴

Settlements (loosening): *The construction of settlements in the West Bank was frozen yesterday. The construction freeze is expected to continue in the near future. The settlement freeze was implemented in accordance with the decision of the political-security cabinet, composed primarily of ministers from [right/left] wing parties. A political official said that the settlement freeze promotes Israel’s national interests, and is consistent with Israel’s commitment to strive for a just and sustainable peace.*

Settlements (deepening): *In the last few months there has been a sharp increase in settlements construction in the West Bank. This increase is expected to continue in the near future. The accelerated construction was done in accordance with the decision of the political-security cabinet, composed primarily of ministers from [right/left] wing parties. A political official said that the increase in settlement construction promotes Israel’s national interests and does not contradict its commitment to strive for a just and sustainable peace.*

5.2 First Wave Results

Figure 26 reports participants’ evaluation of the effects of the two settlement policies on levels of violence, likelihood of peace, and the likelihood of compromise by the Palestinian Authority in negotiations. We estimated predicted probabilities for each outcome from an ordered logit model in which the main treatment is an indicator variable for territorial deepening or loosening, and the outcome is a three-category variable indicating how the policy affects each outcome (reduce; no change; or increase). Figure 26 displays predicted probabilities calculated for the “bad” outcomes:

¹⁴The only difference is in the policy evaluation questions, where we measured the outcomes with five potential answers, instead of three in the second wave.

increase violence and decrease likelihood of peace and PA compromise. It can be seen that for all outcomes, respondents expected that deepening territorial control through settlement expansion would lead to significantly more harmful outcomes than freezing settlement construction. Similar to the results found in the second wave (reported in the main paper), most respondents believed that deepening territorial control will increase violence, decrease the likelihood of peace, and decrease the likelihood of a compromise by the Palestinian Authority in negotiations.

Figure 26: Evaluating Policies (First Wave)





Figure 27 reports levels of support for settlements expansion and settlement freeze by ideological self-placement. We regressed an indicator of policy support on an interaction of the territorial deepening/loosening indicator (i.e., whether respondents were randomly assigned to loosening or a deepening vignette) and a variable measuring respondents' self-placement on a seven points ideological (left-right) scale. As found in the results of the second wave (reported in the main paper), we find that political ideology impacts support for settlement expansion. As one moves right on the political self-placement scale, the more likely is it that he or she will support settlement expansion. Individuals identifying as the left (1-3 on the ideological scale) support settlement freezing far more than settlement construction. Centrist individuals (4 on the scale) equally support both types of policies; and right-wing respondents (5-7 on the self-placed ideological scale) support settlement

construction significantly more than settlement freeze.


Figure 27: Support for Conciliatory and Coercive Policies (First Wave)



We ran the same analysis for policy evaluation. Figures 28, 29, and 30 show that individuals identifying as center and left believe that settlement expansion is far more harmful than settlement freeze in all domains: violence, likelihood of peace, and likelihood of PA compromise in negotiations. These results are very similar to the results found in the second wave (reported in the main paper). This further strengthens the argument that the policy positions of center-left in Israel is shaped by instrumental and security considerations.

As can be seen in Figures 28 and 29, right-wing respondents also tend to view settlement expansion as more likely to increase violence and decrease the likelihood of peace than settlement freeze, but the difference is of a smaller magnitude, compared to the views of the left and the center. There is a small subset of far-right respondents (about 20%) who believes that settlement freeze would be more harmful than settlement expansion in increasing violence and reducing the chances of peace. However, this is a relatively small group to drive the overwhelming support for settlement expansion among the right. Figure 30 shows that right-wing respondents do not believe that settlement expansion would be different from settlement freeze in affecting the likelihood of the Palestinian Authority's position in negotiations.

Figure 28: Evaluating Policies: Violence (First Wave)



Overall, the findings of the first wave are consistent with the results of the second wave: we find that respondents believe that settlement expansion is less effective than settlement freeze in reducing violence, promoting peace, and moderating the Palestinian position in negotiations. At the same time, a majority supports settlement expansion significantly more than settlement freeze. Breaking the results by ideological self-placement, we find that the results are driven by right-wing individuals, similar to the results found in the second wave. The consistency between the two waves is notable not only because of the similarity in the findings, but also because they were fielded on different samples at very different time periods: the first wave was conducted during a relatively peaceful time during the Kerry negotiations, while the second was collected a few months after the 2014 Gaza conflict.

Figure 29: Evaluating Policies: Likelihood of Peace (First Wave)





Table 26: Policy Support and Evaluation: First Wave (Marginal Effects)

	Coefficient	SE	Pval
<i>Settlements</i>			
Policy support			
Support policy	-0.14	0.04	0.00
Policy evaluation			
Reduce: Violence	0.17	0.02	0.00
No change: Violence	0.15	0.02	0.00
Increase: Violence	-0.32	0.04	0.00
Reduce: Likelihood of peace	-0.29	0.03	0.00
No change: Likelihood of peace	0.08	0.02	0.00
Increase: Likelihood of peace	0.21	0.03	0.00
Reduce: Likelihood of PA compromise	-0.25	0.04	0.00
No change: Likelihood of PA compromise	0.10	0.02	0.00
Increase: Likelihood of PA compromise	0.15	0.02	0.00

Note: The table reports marginal effects of a binary indicator for territorial loosening, where 1 indicates loosening and 0 denotes deepening.

Figure 30: Evaluating Policies: Likelihood of PA Compromise (First Wave)



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